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Maurer,	  Andrew	  Christopher	  (M.A.,	  Germanic	  and	  Slavic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures)	  
“The	  Once	  and	  Future	  Site	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  Berlin”:	  A	  Discursive	  Analysis	  of	  Planning,	  Negotiation,	  and	  Reception	  Thesis	  directed	  by	  Assistant	  Professor	  Beverly	  M.	  Weber	  	  This	  paper	  examines	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  the	  planning,	  negotiation,	  and	  reception	  stages	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  at	  Pariser	  Platz	  in	  Berlin,	  which	  imbued	  the	  building	  with	  a	  highly	  politicized	  symbolic	  nature.	  Much	  more	  than	  simply	  a	  building,	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  made	  a	  “statement,”	  which	  acquired	  meaning	  through	  the	  discursive	  formations	  of	  Berlin	  as	  a	  “global	  city,”	  the	  guiding	  doctrine	  of	  Berlin	  as	  	  “critically	  reconstructed,”	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  security	  presence	  in	  post-­‐Wall	  Berlin.	  This	  discourse	  focused	  not	  only	  on	  the	  present	  form	  of	  the	  building,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  site’s	  historical	  form	  and	  visions	  of	  the	  site’s	  future.	  Diverging	  interpretations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  along	  national	  lines,	  concerning	  the	  balance	  of	  security	  with	  transparency	  both	  in	  government	  and	  in	  public	  space,	  revealed	  and	  even	  helped	  shape	  a	  new	  relationship	  between	  the	  former	  guest—a	  “protective	  power”	  during	  the	  Cold	  War—and	  its	  host	  city	  of	  Berlin.	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INTRODUCTION	  On	   January	   9,	   1993,	   a	   bronze	   plate—anchored	   atop	   a	   black	   granite	   base	   and	  inscribed	   with	   the	   phrase	   “The	   Once	   and	   Future	   Site	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   Berlin”—was	  ceremoniously	  placed	  at	  Pariser	  Platz	  2.	  Although	   this	  prominent	  Berlin	  address,	   located	  only	  meters	   from	   the	  Brandenburg	  Gate,	  was	  physically	  barren	   (a	   “prairie	  of	  history,”	   to	  use	  a	   local	  sobriquet)	  (Huyssen,	  56),	   it	  was	  nevertheless	  highly	  charged,	  both	  historically	  and	  politically.	  Far	   from	  entering	  a	  void,	   the	  promised	  U.S.	  Embassy	  would	   instead	  enter	  the	  highly	  contested	  terrain	  of	  architectural	  discourse	  in	  Berlin.	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  restore	  the	  city’s	  capital	  status,	  a	  boom	  in	  architectural	  planning	  reignited	   an	   ongoing	   “Architects’	   Debate”	   (Architektenstreit)	   between	   city	   planners,	  architects,	   and	   critics	   in	   deciding	   what	   form	   the	   “New	   Berlin”	   would	   take	   (Murray	   3).	  Initially,	   the	  epithet	  of	  Berlin	  as	   a	   “global	   city”	  helped	   fuel	   the	   construction	  boom	  (Ward	  239).	   However,	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   City	   Building	   Director	   Hans	   Stimmann,	   “critical	  reconstruction”	   became	   the	   dominant	   doctrine,	   emphasizing	   Berlin’s	   historical	  development	   and	   reconnecting	   Berlin	   with	   its	   late-­‐eighteenth	   and	   nineteenth	   century	  pasts—in	   other	  words,	   reconnecting	   Berlin	  with	   its	   pre-­‐Cold	  War,	   pre-­‐national	   socialist,	  and	  even	  pre-­‐Weimar	  modernist	  pasts	  (Murray	  12).	  Just	  as	  Germany	  was	  seeking	  to	  re-­‐form	  a	  collective	  identity	  in	  post-­‐Wall	  Berlin,	  the	  United	   States	   was	   seeking	   to	   embed	   itself	   within	   this	   “New	   Berlin.”	   With	   the	   Cold	  War	  coming	   to	   an	   end,	   many	   physical	   traces	   of	   the	   Allied	   legacy	   in	   Berlin	   were	   “slowly	   but	  surely	  disappearing”	  (Verheyen	  100).	  Plans	  to	  move	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  back	  to	  Pariser	  Platz	  positioned	   U.S.	   government	   representation	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   “New	   Berlin,”	   and	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consequently,	  also	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  ongoing	  Architects’	  Debate.	  In	  doing	  so,	  U.S.	  Embassy	  plans	   expanded	   the	   discourse.	   No	   longer	   focusing	   on	   questions	   of	   German	   collective	  identity	   and	   historical	   representation	   or	   utopian	   “global	   city”	   visions,	   the	   planned	  construction	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  generated	  transnational	  concerns.	  Negotiations	  between	  the	  host	  and	  guest	  nation	  over	  the	  “once	  and	  future	  site	  of	  the	  American	  Embassy”	  revealed	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  the	  former	  occupational	  and	  protective	  power	  in	  Berlin.	  Furthermore,	  increased	   U.S.	   security	   regulations,	   following	   the	   August	   7,	   1998	   bombings	   of	   U.S.	  embassies	  in	  Kenya	  and	  Tanzania,	  shifted	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  discourse	  from	  matters	  of	  style	  to	   concerns	   of	   balancing	   security	   with	   transparency	   and	   openness,	   both	   in	   government	  (the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  building)	  and	  in	  public	  space	  (Pariser	  Platz).	  Noticeably	   prolonged	   planning	   and	   negotiation	   phases,	   as	   well	   as	   an	  overwhelmingly	   critical	   representation	   in	  German	  media,	  differentiated	   the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  from	  its	  Pariser	  Platz	  neighbors.	  Although	  California-­‐based	  architectural	  firm	  Moore	  Ruble	  Yudell	  Architects	  and	  Planners	  (MRY)	  won	  the	  design	  competition	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  1996,	  it	  had	  to	  reformulate	  the	  winning	  design	  to	  meet	  increased	  U.S.	  security	  regulations	  of	   1998.	  This	   led	   to	   a	   six-­‐year,	   politicized	   stalemate,	   during	  which	   the	  United	   States	   and	  Germany	  negotiated	  the	  details	  of	  security	  implications.	  Finally	  in	  2004,	  a	  compromise	  was	  reached.	  In	  all,	  after	  the	  promissory	  plaque	  was	  placed	  at	  Pariser	  Platz,	  it	  would	  be	  another	  fifteen	   plus	   years	   (and	   another	   five	   U.S.	   ambassadors)	   until	   the	   official	   opening	   of	   U.S.	  Embassy	   on	   July	   4,	   2008.	   As	   the	   final	   building	   to	   be	   constructed	   on	   the	   square,	   the	   U.S.	  Embassy	  completed	   the	  Pariser	  Platz	   façade,	  yet	   the	  building’s	   representation	   in	  German	  media	   was	   far	   from	   celebratory,	   a	   contradiction	   central	   to	   this	   paper’s	   investigation.	  Diverging	  discourse	  along	  national	   lines,	  concerning	  the	  completed	  building,	  revealed	  the	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constructive	  nature	  of	   representation.	  Through	  media	   representation,	   the	  U.S.	   Embassy’s	  planning,	   negotiation,	   and	   reception	   became	   a	   testing	   ground	   for	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Germany.	  
Recent	  Scholarly	  Work	  on	  Berlin’s	  Urban	  Landscape	  The	  amount	  of	  recent	  scholarly	  work	  dealing	  with	  the	  urban	  landscape	  of	  post-­‐Wall	  Berlin	   is	  extensive.	  This	   is	  undoubtedly	  due	  to	  Berlin’s	  unique	  history	  of	  having	  been	  the	  capital	  of	  over	   five	  different	   regimes	  within	   the	  past	   century	  and	  a	  half.	  This	  history	  has	  imprinted	  itself	  on	  Berlin’s	  urban	  landscape.	  Massive	  destruction	  caused	  by	  World	  War	  II	  (as	   well	   as	   post-­‐War	   demolition	   and	   planning)	   has	   dramatically	   changed	   Berlin’s	   urban	  surface,	   creating	   a	   highly	   contested	   city	   center.	   Guiding	   this	   paper	   are	   two	   exemplary	  works,	   Brian	   Ladd’s	   The	   Ghosts	   of	   Berlin,	   and	   Andreas	   Huyssen’s	   Present	   Pasts,	   which	  provide	  excellent	  insight	  into	  the	  significance	  of	  buildings,	  ruins,	  and	  vacant	  lots	  in	  Berlin,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  to	  approach	  studying	   them.	   “Buildings	  matter,”	  as	  succinctly	  put	  by	  Ladd,	  “because	   they	   are	   symbols	   and	   repositories	   of	   memory”	   (Ladd	   4).	   Elaborating	   on	   the	  particular	   situation	   facing	   post-­‐Wall	   Berlin,	   Ladd	   observes	   that	   each	   “proposal	   for	  construction,	  demolition,	  preservation,	  or	  renovation	  ignites	  into	  a	  battle	  over	  symbols	  of	  Berlin	   and	   of	   Germany”	   (Ladd	   235).	   Central	   to	   Ladd’s	   thesis	   is	   that	   the	   present	   urban	  landscape	  of	  Berlin	  is	  haunted	  by	  “ghosts”	  from	  distinct	  historical	  periods	  of	  its	  past.	  This	  “haunting”	   influences	   which	   types	   of	   architecture	   are	   built,	   as	   well	   as	   which	   types	   of	  architecture	  are	  purposely	  avoided.	  Clearly,	  selective	  historical	  representation	  embodied	  in	  architecture	  makes	  (re)construction	  highly	  politicized.	  	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Huyssen	  has	  written	  extensively	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  reading	  the	  city,	  where	  old	  and	  new	  intermingle	  in	  palimpsest	  form.	  Huyssen	  relates	  post-­‐Wall	  Berlin	  to	  a	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prism,	   “through	  which	  we	   can	   focus	   issues	   of	   contemporary	   urbanism	   and	   architecture,	  national	   identity	   and	   statehood,	   historical	  memory	   and	   forgetting”	   (49).	   Situating	   Berlin	  within	   the	   globalization	   discourse,	   Huyssen	   describes	   how	   future	   plans	   to	   “create	   the	  capital	   of	   the	   21st	   century,”	   or	   Berlin’s	   “present	   futures,”	   have	   been	   complicated	   by	   a	  preoccupation	   with	   memory	   and	   historical	   representation,	   or	   so	   called	   “present	   pasts”	  (Huyssen	  52,	  11,	  14).	  Not	  only	  do	  these	  works	  provide	  information	  as	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  Berlin’s	  urban	  landscape,	  but	  they	  also	  exemplify	  how	  to	  approach	  its	  study.	  Two	  features	  stand	  out	  and	  will	  help	  guide	  my	  examination:	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  and	  a	  multi-­‐temporal	  focus.	  Architecture,	  and	   thus	   its	   study,	   is	   interconnected	  with	  other	  disciplines,	   such	  as	  history,	  politics,	   and	   urban	   planning.	   Undoubtedly,	   a	   comprehensive	   study	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy’s	  construction	  needs	  to	  be	  interdisciplinary	  and	  focus	  not	  only	  on	  its	  current	  visual	  form,	  but	  also	  consider	  the	  site’s	  past	  as	  well	  as	  alternative	  visions	  of	   the	  site’s	  present	  and	  future.	  This	   is	   summed	   up	   well	   in	   what	   Huyssen	   calls	   an	   “urban	   imaginary,”	   whose	   “temporal	  reach	  may	  well	  put	  two	  different	  things	  in	  one	  place:	  memories	  of	  what	  was	  there	  before,	  imagined	  alternatives	  to	  what	  there	  is”	  (Huyssen	  7).	  	   While	   Berlin’s	   urban	   landscape	   has	   been	   well	   researched,	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  particular	  constellation	  of	  discourse	  that	  formed	  as	  the	  United	  States	  attempted	  to	  embed	  itself	  within	   the	   urban	   landscape	   of	   the	   “New	  Berlin”	   is	   lacking.	   Although	   the	   embassy’s	  planning,	   construction,	   and	   reception	   have	   found	  media	   attention	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   rather	  short	   current	   event	   updates	   or	   feuilleton	   style	   editorials),	   scholarly	   work	   about	   the	  specifics	  of	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Embassy	  is	  scarce.	  This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  by	  following	  in	  the	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  of	  urban	  landscape	  study,	  yet	  applying	  it	  specifically	  to	  the	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U.S.	   Embassy’s	   construction	   and	   representation	   in	   the	   media.	   Divided	   into	   three	   main	  sections,	  this	  work	  will	  (1)	  locate	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  at	  Pariser	  Platz	  within	  the	  more	  general,	  preexisting	   constellation	   of	   architectural	   discourse	   and	   historical	   context	   of	   Berlin,	   (2)	  examine	  the	  discourse	  generated	  by	  planning	  and	  negotiation	  phases	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy,	  relying	  on	  primary	  texts	  from	  architects,	  city	  planners,	  government	  documents,	  politicians,	  and	  critics,	  and	  (3)	  analyze	   the	  representation	  of	   the	  U.S.	  Embassy	   in	   the	  German	  media.	  The	   conclusion	   will	   bring	   the	   history	   of	   the	   embassy	   up	   to	   date	   and	   consider	   future	  implications	  brought	  up	  in	  this	  study.	  	  Throughout	   this	   study,	   representation	   will	   be	   an	   important	   concept.	   This	  investigation	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   is	   informed	   by	   a	   poststructuralist	   approach	   to	  representation,	  in	  which	  meaning	  is	  neither	  universally	  recognizable	  (reflective	  approach)	  nor	   a	   one-­‐way	   process	   (intentional	   approach).	   Rather,	   representation	  will	   be	   viewed	   as	  produced	  through	  the	  process	  of	  discourse	  between	  multiple	  voices.	  Less	  concerned	  with	  the	  “poetics,”	  or	  “how”	  of	  representation	  associated	  with	  Ferdinand	  de	  Saussure’s	  study	  of	  semiotics,	   this	   examination	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   will	   rather	   focus	   on	   the	   “politics	   of	  representation,”	   or	   its	   “effects	   and	   consequences,”	   as	   associated	   with	   Michel	   Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  discursive	  formations	  (Hall	  6).	  Here,	  discursive	  formations	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  “a	  cluster	  (or	  formation)	  of	  ideas,	  images	  and	  practices.”	  They	  provide	  ways	  of	  talking	  about	  and	  regulate	  conduct	  associated	  with	  “a	  particular	  topic,	  social	  activity	  or	  institutional	  site	  in	  society”	  (Hall	  6).	  The	  U.S.	  Embassy	  is	  situated	  within	  discursive	  formations	  concerning	  Berlin	  as	  a	  “global	  city”,	  the	  city	  doctrine	  of	  “critical	  reconstruction,”	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  role	  in	  post-­‐Wall	  Berlin.	  The	  architecture	  of	  the	  embassy	  building	  itself	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  a	  part	   of	   the	   discourse.	   However,	   just	   as	   with	   any	   text,	   the	   statement	   made	   through	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architecture	   can	   be	   interpreted	   in	   different	   ways.	   This	   study	   will	   examine	   how	   the	  knowledge	  produced	  by	  discursive	  formations	  concerning	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  connected	  with	  transnational	   power,	   regulated	   conduct,	   constructed	   identities	   and	   influenced	   the	   U.S.	  Embassy’s	   reception	   (Hall	   6).	   The	   discursive	   formations	   analyzed	  will	   be	   placed	   in	   their	  specific	  historical	  context.	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I.	  PLACING	  THE	  U.S.	  EMBASSY	  IN	  CONTEXT	  
	   A	   building	   needs	   to	   be	   seen	   in	   its	   temporal,	   spatial,	   and	   social	   contexts	   for	   the	  “statements”	  it	  makes	  to	  the	  public	  to	  be	  understood.	  For	  example,	  as	  Ladd	  points	  out,	  the	  work	  of	  architect	  Karl	  Friedrich	  Schinkel	  is	  often	  celebrated	  by	  neoconservatives	  today	  as	  exemplifying	   traditional	   Prussian	   neoclassical	   architecture.	   However,	   in	   his	   own	   day,	  Schinkel	   “strove	   to	   shatter	   the	   uniformity	   of	   eighteenth	   century	   Berlin”	   (Ladd	   233).	   In	  other	   words,	   Schinkel’s	   architecture,	   when	   placed	   in	   a	   different	   social	   and	   historical	  context,	  makes	  a	  much	  different	  statement.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  architecture	  cannot	  exude	  an	  immediate	  authority	  or	  have	   an	   affective	   component	   in	   its	   interaction	  with	  human	  beings.	   Still,	   this	   authority	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  different	  ways.	  We	  need	  only	  look	  as	  far	  as	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  to	  see	  this.	  Although	  the	  concrete	  wall,	  topped	  with	  barbed	  wire	  and	  surrounded	  by	  guard	  shacks	  and	  a	  “no-­‐man’s	  land”	  definitely	  restricted	  mobility	  and	  exuded	  authority,	  interpretations	  of	  the	  wall	   differed.	   The	   East’s	   “Anti-­‐Fascist	   Protection	   Wall,”	   patrolled	   with	   guard	   dogs	   and	  military	  to	  retain	  its	  own	  citizens,	  was	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  West	  as	  the	  “Wall	  of	  Shame”	  and	  often	   covered	   in	   colorful	   lampooning	   graffiti	   in	   protest	   of	   the	   wall.	   Clearly,	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  was	  socially	  constructed.	  	  This	   is	   also	   the	   case	   with	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy.	   The	   U.S.	   Embassy	   is	   a	   building,	  representing	   the	   U.S.	   government	   in	   its	   host	   city	   of	   Berlin,	   and	   sheltering	   the	   people	  working	  and	  interacting	  with	  the	  government.	  This	  building	  is	  situated	  in	  a	  certain	  place,	  is	  made	  of	  certain	  materials,	  takes	  a	  certain	  form,	  and	  is	  covered	  with	  a	  certain	  façade.	  These	  are	   the	   signifiers,	   which	   must	   then	   be	   interpreted,	   through,	   for	   example,	   the	   discursive	  formation	   of	   a	   “global	   city,”	   the	   discursive	   formation	   of	   “critical	   reconstruction”	   or	   the	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discursive	   formation	   of	   “U.S.	   security	   presence.”	   Through	   discourse,	   the	   building’s	  characteristics	  are	  made	  to	  speak.	  However,	  just	  as	  any	  passage	  in	  literature,	  a	  building	  can	  produce	  multiple	  meanings	  and	  interpretations	  in	  various	  audiences.	  Conscious	  of	  the	  fact	  that	   “the	   social	   perception	   of	   architecture	   does	   not	   occur	   in	   a	   vacuum	   but	   in	   a	   cultural	  context	  shaped	  by	  history”	  (Rosenfeld	  125),	  the	  following	  section	  will	  attempt	  to	  highlight	  the	  historical	  context	  and	  social	  discourse	  of	  Berlin	  architecture	   into	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  which	  helped	  various	  actors	  construct	  meaning	  out	  of	  the	  “statements”	  made	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  at	  Pariser	  Platz.	  
Germany,	  Politics,	  and	  Architecture	  Even	  before	   there	  was	  a	  Germany,	   there	  were	   cultural	  debates	  as	   to	  what	   type	  of	  architecture	   best	   represented	   “German”	   identity.	   The	   kings	   of	   Prussia	   tended	   to	   take	   a	  liking	  to	  neoclassicism.	  However	  many	  architects	  and	  intellectuals	  debated	  its	  virtues,	  and	  tended	   to	   see	   romantic	   neogothic	   architecture	   as	   more	   representative	   of	   “authentic”	  German	  culture	  (Strom	  136).	  When	  German	  unification	  came	  in	  1871,	  under	  the	  Prussian	  Hohenzollerns,	   architecture	   became	   nationalized,	   and	   the	   architecture	   in	   the	   newly	  founded	  nation’s	  capital	  became	  representative	  of	  the	  nation.	  	  During	   the	   Weimar	   Republic,	   architecture	   became	   explicitly	   politicized,	   with	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  modernist	  movement,	  which	  openly	  associated	  politics	  and	  architecture,	  in	   the	   belief	   that	   “modern,	   democratic	   people	   in	  modern	   industrial	   society	   should	   build	  rational,	   modern	   structures,	   using	   new	   materials	   that	   made	   buildings	   lighter	   and	   more	  flexible”	   (Strom	   136-­‐137).	   However,	   the	   first	  modernist	  movement,	   best	   represented	   by	  the	  Bauhaus,	  was	  soon	  impeded	  by	  the	  Nazi	  takeover.	  The	  militaristic	  Nazi	  regime	  found	  its	  interests	   to	   be	   better	   represented	   by	   a	   monumental	   neoclassical	   style.	   Preferred	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architectural	  style	  seemed	  to	  coincide	  with	  each	  regime	  change	  in	  Germany.	  Following	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  this	  would	  also	  be	  the	  case,	  as	  a	  second	  wave	  of	  modernism	  overtook	  Germany.	  Returning	  to	  Germany	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  second	  wave	  of	  modernism	  was	  much	  more	  commercialized	  in	  form	  than	  the	  first.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  gained	  large	  acceptance	  in	  post-­‐War	  Germany,	   in	  part	   because	   it	   represented	   a	  break	  with	   a	  difficult	   past,	   in	   the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Stunde	  null.	  West	  German	  architects	  consciously	  avoided	  historically	  inspired	  architecture,	   such	   as	  neoclassicism,	  which	  became	   “taboo”	  because	  of	   its	   (mis)use	   in	   the	  monumental	  neoclassical	  architecture	  characteristic	  of	  many	  Adolf	  Hitler	  and	  Albert	  Speer	  designs.1	  Instead,	   the	  modernist	   “international	   style”	   based	   on	   a	   decentralized	   city	   plan,	  with	  divided	  city	  functions	  (housing,	  shopping,	  etc.),	  came	  to	  dominate	  Berlin	  architecture.	  
“The	  Architects’	  Debate”	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Postmodernist	  Architecture	  The	   specific	   “Berlin	   Architecture	   Debate,”	   which	   erupted	   in	   the	   mid	   1990s,	   was	  actually	  the	  third	  flare-­‐up	  of	  a	  broader	  Architects’	  Debate	  stretching	  back	  to	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  coinciding	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  postmodern	  architecture	  in	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  (Rosenfeld	  194).	  An	  overview	  of	  this	  broader	  Architects’	  Debate,	  waged	  between	  “modernists”	   and	   “postmodernists,”	   will	   help	   contextualize	   its	   revival	   in	   the	   1990s	   in	  Berlin.2	  Postmodernism	  manifested	   itself	   in	   architecture	   as	   “a	   move	   away	   from	  modern	  architecture’s	  claim	  to	  universal	  validity”	  placing	  emphasis	  instead	  on	  “pluralism”	  (Welsch	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  East	  Berlin	  experienced	  a	  brief	  resurgence	  of	  neoclassical	  inspired	  architecture	  from	  around	  1950	  to	  1955	  under	  Ulbricht	  (out	  of	  a	  rejection	  of	  modernism’s	  formalism	  and	  cosmopolitanism).	  This	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  former	  Stalinallee,	  now	  Karl-­‐Marx-­‐Straße	  and	  parts	  of	  Frankfurter	  Allee,	  and	  is	  highly	  praised	  by	  many	  contemporary	  postmodern	  architects.	  However	  after	  Khrushchev’s	  insistence	  on	  efficient	  architecture,	  East	  Germany	  basically	  returned	  to	  an	  “international	  style”	  (Ladd:	  182-­‐186).	  2	  This	  section	  is	  indebted	  to	  Gavriel	  Rosenfeld’s	  “The	  Architects’	  Debate.”	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34).	  3	  As	   in	   literature,	   this	   pluralism	  was	  marked	  by	   “double	   coding,”	  which	  meant	   using	  two	   or	   more	   architectural	   languages	   simultaneously:	   “traditional	   and	   modern,	   elite	   and	  popular,	   international	   and	   regional”	   (Welsch	   36).	   For	   example,	   neoclassical	   and	  modern	  elements	  juxtaposed	  could	  create	  a	  “complexity	  and	  contradiction	  in	  architecture”	  to	  which	  the	   title	   of	   U.S.	   architect	   Robert	   Venturi’s	   seminal	   work	   alludes.4	  Because	   of	   its	   unique	  history,	   a	   double	   coding	   of	   historically	   inspired	   and	   modernist	   elements	   made	  postmodernist	   architecture	   controversial	   in	   the	   Federal	   Republic;	   it	   seemed	   to	   awaken	  ghosts	  of	  an	  uncomfortable	  German	  past.	  	  Similar	   to	   the	   more	   widely	   known	   Historians’	   Dispute	   (Historikerstreit)	   of	   the	  1980s,	   the	   Architects’	   Debate	   was	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   questions	   of	   how	   to	   deal	   with	  memories	  of	  National	  Socialism	  in	  Germany.	  In	  the	  Historians’	  Dispute,	  German	  historians	  and	  others	   concerned	   themselves	  with	  whether	   the	  Nazi	   past	   should	  be	   “normalized”	   or	  keep	   its	  exceptional	   status	   in	  German	  consciousness	   (Rosenfeld	  189).	   In	  other	  words,	  up	  for	   dispute	   was	   how	   the	   Third	   Reich	   fit	   into	   the	   overall	   span	   of	   German	   history.	   In	  comparison,	   the	   Architects’	   Debate	   was	   more	   specialized,	   but	   undoubtedly	   just	   as	  politically	   and	   symbolically	   significant.	   Architects,	   city	   planners,	   politicians	   and	   others	  debated	   how	   architectural	   styles	   (mis)used	   during	   the	   Third	   Reich	   should	   influence	  “present	  and	  future	  architectural	  development	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic”	  (Rosenfeld	  189).	  	  Sparking	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   the	  Architect’s	  Debate	   in	   1977,	   British	   architect	   James	  Stirling’s	   Neue	   Staatsgalerie	   in	   Stuttgart	   became	   the	   first	   postmodern	   building	   to	   be	  commissioned	  by	   the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	   (Rosenfeld	  190).	  Even	  at	   first	   glance,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Postmodernism	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  “manifestation”	  or	  a	  “variation”	  of	  Modernism,	  which	  “freed	  itself	  of	  some	  of	  the	  restraints	  of	  Modernism,”	  yet	  “remained	  true	  to	  other	  precepts”	  	  (Welsch	  36).	  	  4	  Robert	  Venturi,	  “Complexity	  and	  Contradiction	  in	  Architecture”	  (1966).	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one	   is	   immediately	   struck	   by	   the	   national	   art	   gallery’s	   double	   coding:	   Monumental	  travertine	   and	   sandstone	   covered	  walls	   transition	   smoothly	   into	   asymmetrical	   curves	   of	  glass,	   framed	   with	   bright-­‐green	   covered	   steel.	   While	   statues	   lining	   the	   monumental	  rotunda	  courtyard	  allow	  one’s	  mind	   to	  drift	  back	   to	   the	  neoclassicism	  of	  Schinkel’s	  Altes	  Museum,	   bold	   primary	   and	   secondary	   colored	   steel	   beams,	   curving	   atop	   the	   massive	  exterior	  walls,	  confidently	  anchor	  the	  museum’s	  visitors	  in	  a	  more	  contemporary	  time.	  Raw	  concrete	  columns	  seem	  to	  be	  used	  more	  as	  adornment	  than	  for	  structural	  integrity,	  in	  front	  of	  the	  modern	  glass	  and	  steel	  office	  entrance,	  contrasting	  historical	  form	  with	  modern	  form	  and	  materials.	  Modernists	  promptly	  attacked	  the	  neoclassical	  aspects	  of	  Stirling’s	  design,	  accusing	  postmodernism	   of	   violating	   a	   “strict	   taboo”	   in	   Germany	   by	   resurrecting	   a	   “fascist”	   style	  (Rosenfeld	   193).	   For	   example,	   Frei	   Otto,	   a	   collaborator	   of	   prominent	   modern	   architect	  Günter	  Behnisch	   in	   creating	  Munich’s	  modern	  1972	  Olympic	   complex,	   attacked	   the	  Neue	  Staatsgalerie	   as	   “brutalistic,”	   “a	   kind	   of	   fortress	   architecture”	   and	   “a	   demonstration	   of	  power”	   (Rosenfeld	   193).	   Central	   to	   the	   postmodern	   attack	   was	   the	   presumption	   that	  certain	  types	  of	  government	  produced	  certain	  kinds	  of	  architecture	  (194).	  Without	  a	  doubt,	  as	  a	  national	  gallery,	   the	  public	  building	  was	   linked	   to	   its	  government.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	  monumental	  stone	  elements	  of	  the	  Neue	  Staatsgalerie,	  many	  modernists	  promoted	  the	  use	  of	   only	  modern	  materials,	   such	  as	   “glass,	   steel	   and	   concrete	  …	  arranged	   in	   asymmetrical	  compositions”	   attempting	   to	   reach	   a	   “lightness	   and	   transparency”	   characteristic	   of	  “democratic”	   architecture	   (Rosenfeld	   192).	   Behnisch	   made	   this	   point	   clear	   in	   1981:	  “[W]hat	  happens	  inside,	  must	  be	  transparent	  for	  those	  who	  see	  the	  final	  product.	  It	  can’t	  be	  that	  one	  has	  the	  impression	  that	  secret	  powers	  rule	  within.	  […]	  Our	  form’s	  function	  must	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be	   apparent”	   (Behnisch,	   775).5	  At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   comments	   lies	   the	  balance	   between	   state	   power	   and	   democracy.	   Very	   similar	   discourse	  would	   reemerge	   in	  the	  1990s	   and	  2000s	   concerning	  both	  Berlin’s	   new	   federal	   government	  headquarters	   on	  the	  Spree	  River	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  at	  Pariser	  Platz.	  Initially,	   postmodernists,	   led	   by	   European	   rationalist	   architects	   Aldo	   Rossi,	   and	  Oswald	  Mathias	  Ungers,	  responded	  to	  the	  charges	  of	  fascism	  by	  simply	  denying	  them.	  They	  insisted	  that	  there	  was	  no	  “fascist”	  style	  and	  promoted	  instead	  an	  “architecture	  of	  memory,”	  which	   adopted	   “universally	   recurring”	   forms	   (Rosenfeld	   192).	   They	   broke	   with	   the	  modernist	   maxim	   coined	   by	   Louis	   Sullivan	   “form	   follows	   function”	   and	   asserted	   the	  autonomy	  of	  form	  and	  function	  (and	  thus	  of	  political	  systems	  and	  aesthetics).	  However	  in	  the	  1980s,	  postmodernist	  Victor	  Lampugnani	  and	  Leon	  Kier,	  among	  others,	  escalated	   the	  debate	  by	  hurling	  the	  “fascist”	   label	  back	  at	  their	  attackers	  (the	  modernists)	  and	  marking	  what	   Rosenfeld	   sees	   as	   the	   second	   stage	   in	   the	   Architects’	   debate	   (194).	   In	   order	   to	  legitimate	  their	  use	  of	  historically	  inspired	  architectural	  elements,	  various	  postmodernists	  attempted	  to	  transfer	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  Holocaust	  to	  modernism,	  industry,	  and	  technology.	  Some	   even	   attempted	   to	   rehabilitate	  Nazi	   architects,	   even	  Albert	   Speer	   (Rosenfeld	   205).	  While	   at	   times	   trivializing	   grave	   crimes	   against	   humanity,	   the	   postmodernist	   view	   did	  much	  to	  normalize	  architectural	   forms	  that	  were	   forbidden	   in	  post-­‐War	  Germany.	  By	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Over	  twenty	  years	  later,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  Behnisch	  had	  stayed	  true	  to	  this	  claim.	  His	  plans	  for	  the	  Akademie	  der	  Künste	  on	  Pariser	  Platz	  would	  be	  the	  only	  façade	  to	  be	  completed	  in	  glass	  and	  steel,	  which	  he	  insisted	  upon	  because	  the	  museum	  was	  the	  only	  public	  building	  on	  the	  square.	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1990s	   postmodernist	   architecture	   had	   become	   a	   formidable	   architectural	   movement	   on	  par	  with	  modernist	  architecture.6	  This	   brings	   us	   up	   to	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Berlin	   Wall.	   Reunification	   of	   Germany,	   the	  desirable	  vacant	  space	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  wall	  in	  the	  city	  center,	  and	  demand	  for	  developing	  the	   nation’s	   capital	   sparked	   the	   third	   phase	   of	   the	   architectural	   debate,	   the	   “Berlin	  Architecture	   Debate.”	   Modernists	   envisioned	   a	   “New	   Berlin”	   and	   promoted	   visions	   of	   a	  global	   and	   modern	   capital	   city.	   “Critical	   Reconstructionists”	   looked	   to	   the	   past	   for	  inspiration,	   to	   secure	   the	   “historical	   development”	   of	   the	   city	   and	   rescue	   the	   city’s	  “authentic”	  Prussian	  character.	  	  
The	  Wall	  Falls	  into	  Opportunity	  Following	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  in	  1989,	  and	  coinciding	  with	  a	  reclaimed	  capital	  city	  status	  in	  1991,	  Berlin	  became	  the	  site	  of	  one	  the	  most	  massive	  construction	  projects	  in	  history.	  Hundreds	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	  have	  been	  invested	  in	  the	  (re)construction	  of	  Berlin	  since	  1990	   (Till	  44).	   Ironically,	  destruction	  caused	  by	  World	  War	   II,	   and	  protection	   from	  development	  as	  a	  “death	  strip”	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  created	  architectural	  opportunity—as	  open	  space.	  The	  stretch	  of	  land	  between	  Leipziger	  Platz	  and	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate,	  once	  “a	  mined	   no-­‐man’s-­‐land	   framed	   by	   the	   wall,”	   became	   a	   “wide	   stretch	   of	   dirt,	   grass,	   and	  remnants	  of	  former	  pavement	  under	  a	  big	  sky”	  (Huyssen	  56).	  How	  to	  treat	  this	  emerging	  openness	  was	  up	  for	  debate.	  Daniel	  Libeskind,	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Museum	  in	  Berlin,	  suggested	  embracing	  the	  open	  space	  around	  Potzdamer	  Platz	  as	  just	  that,	  open	  space:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Although	  Rosenfeld’s	  account	  provides	  an	  excellent	  overview	  of	  how	  architects	  used	  the	  label	  of	  “fascist”	  to	  compete	  for	  architectural	  power	  in	  Germany,	  many	  did	  not	  resort	  to	  this	  mudslinging.	  Furthermore,	  although	  for	  simplicity’s	  sake	  the	  architects	  have	  been	  labeled	  as	  either	  “modernist”	  or	  “postmodernist”,	  this	  blurs	  the	  lines	  between	  the	  ideological	  diversity	  of	  architects,	  many	  of	  whom	  refused	  the	  label	  of	  “modernist”	  or	  “postmodernist.”	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I	  suggest	  a	  wilderness,	  one	  kilometer	  long,	  within	  which	  everything	  can	  stay	  as	  it	  is.	  The	  street	  simply	  ends	  in	  the	  bushes.	  Wonderful.	  After	  all,	  this	  area	  is	  the	  result	  of	  today’s	  divine	  natural	  law:	  nobody	  wanted	  it,	  nobody	  planned	  it,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  firmly	  implanted	  in	  all	  our	  minds.	  (Huyssen	  65)7	  	  	  However,	  others,	  especially	  city	  planners	  and	  marketers,	  saw	  the	  open	  space	  as	  an	  opportunity	   to	   draw	   investment	   in	   real	   estate.	   And	   this	   investment	   was	   sorely	   needed:	  because	  of	  its	  highly	  subsidized	  status	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Berlin’s	  local	  economy	  had	  in	  effect	   fallen	   asleep,	   only	   to	   “wake	   up”	   after	   reunification	   with	   “an	   economic	   structure	  rooted	  in	  the	  1960s”	  (Strom	  91).	  A	  cessation	  of	  subsidies	  in	  the	  West	  and	  GDR	  production	  in	  the	  East	  meant	  that	  Berlin	  had	  to	  face	  difficult	  economic	  restructuring	  challenges	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  sought	  to	  become	  a	  global	  and	  capital	  city	  (Ward	  245).	  Local	  officials	  became	  anxious	   to	   attract	   new	   investment	   (Strom	   91).	   Further	   complicating	   matters,	   the	   open	  space	  for	  investment	  was	  within	  Berlin’s	  new	  center	  and	  thus	  loaded	  with	  symbolic	  value	  as	  to	  what	  the	  “New	  Berlin”	  would	  become.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  outcome,	  to	  reach	  either	  an	  “open”	   global	   or	   a	   “united”	   national	   vision,	   Berlin	   faced	   huge	   economic	   challenges.	   To	  attract	   investment,	   Berlin	   needed	   a	   new	   image—a	   break	   with	   its	   recent	   Cold	   War	   and	  fascist	  pasts.	  
Global	  City	  Visions	  It	  seems	  only	  natural	  that,	  after	  emerging	  from	  a	  painfully	  divided	  Cold	  War	  history	  experienced	  in	  a	  heavily	  bordered	  city,	  Berliners	  would	  be	  attracted	  to	  its	  opposite:	  visions	  of	   openness	   and	   unification.	   These	   two	   visions	   hint	   at	   the	   interesting	   path	   globalization	  would	  take	  in	  Germany.	  While,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  cultivating	  its	  image	  as	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Libeskind’s	  unrealized	  proposal	  is	  included	  here	  to	  point	  out	  that	  there	  were	  often	  many	  thought	  provoking	  designs	  that	  did	  not	  find	  their	  way	  into	  being,	  partially	  as	  a	  result	  of	  critical	  reconstruction’s	  dominance	  in	  the	  Architects’	  Debate.	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united	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany,	   city	   boosters	   also	   hyped	  Berlin’s	   open	   “global	   city”	  image:	  “unfettered,	  borderless	  global	  cityness,	  hankering	  after	  an	  electronic-­‐age	  equivalent	  of	  the	  world-­‐city	  label”	  of	  Berlin	  in	  the	  1920s	  (Ward	  240).	  However,	  as	  Ward	  reminds	  us,	  a	  global	   city,	   as	   defined	  by	   Sassen	   (1991),	   actually	  works	   covertly	   against	   the	  nation-­‐state	  (Ward	   241).	   Thus,	   Berlin’s	   path	   to	   globalization	  was	   a	   particular	   one,	   hoping	   to	   reach	   a	  global	   city	   status	   yet	   also	   gain	   more	   local	   recognition	   as	   a	   national	   symbol	   of	   unified	  Germany.	   These	   competing	   forces,	   between	   global	   and	   national,	   would	   soon	   become	  central	  to	  the	  architectural	  debate	  in	  Berlin:	  Should	  Berlin	  adopt	  a	  international	  globalized	  style,	  or	  seek	  a	  historically	  influenced	  “German”	  style?”	  Let	  us	  first	  examine	  Berlin’s	  “global	  city”	  image.	  Although	   Berlin	   of	   the	   1990s	   lacked	   adequate	   infrastructure	   to	   claim	   global	   city	  status,	  images	  representing	  Berlin	  on	  route	  to	  becoming	  a	  “global	  city”	  may	  have	  provided	  the	  initial	  steps	  towards	  its	  material	  transformation	  (Ward	  242).	  Boosters	  of	  the	  new	  city	  image	   included	   city	   officials,	   real	   estate	   developers,	   planners,	   and	   marketers	   (Till	   31).	  Many	   of	   their	   interests	   were	   pooled	   together	   in	   the	   public-­‐private	   Partner	   für	   Berlin	  (Partners	   for	   Berlin).	   According	   to	   its	  website	   (2011),	   Partner	   für	   Berlin’s	   purpose	   is	   to	  promote	   the	   city	   as	   a	   brand:	   “We	   provide	   investors	   on-­‐site	   support,	   help	   Berlin-­‐based	  companies	  tap	  foreign	  markets,	  and	  make	  the	  city	  a	  strong	  brand.	  Active	  both	  locally	  and	  internationally,	  we	   are	   engaged	   in	   local,	   European	   and	   international	   networks.”	   (Partner	  für	   Berlin).	   During	   late	   1990s,	   the	   city	   image	   being	   promoted	   in	   local	   and	   international	  markets	  by	  Partner	  für	  Berlin	  was	  one	  of	  a	  New	  Berlin:	  “DAS	  NEUE	  Berlin.”	  Partner	  für	  Berlin	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  positive:	  instead	  of	  loathing	   in	   Berlin’s	   lagging	   infrastructure,	   it	   celebrated	   Berlin’s	   “becoming.”	   This	   was	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evident	   in	   a	   new	   slogan	   that	   accompanied	   Partner	   für	   Berlin’s	   advertisements	   plastered	  throughout	  the	  city:	  “Berlin	  wird—Berlin	  becomes”	  (Huyssen	  54).	  During	  summers	  of	  the	  late	  1990s,	  tours	  put	  the	  city’s	  transformation	  itself	  on	  display	  for	  locals	  and	  visitors.	  Under	  the	  title	  “Schaustelle	  Berlin”	  (Showcase	  City:	  a	  conflation	  of	  the	  German	  words	  “Baustelle,”	  construction	  site,	  and	  “Schau,”	  show),	  tourists	  could	  visit	  prominent	  construction	  sites	  and	  see	   the	   “behind	   the	   scenes”	   reality	   of	   Berlin’s	   becoming	   (Till	   33).	   Newly	   completed	  buildings	  could	  also	  be	  visited	   in	   tours	  under	   the	  program	  “Berlin—offene	  Stadt,	  Berlin—open	   city”	   (Huyssen	   84).	   In	   effect,	   these	   sightseeing	   tours	   seemed	   to	   take	   the	   form	   of	  architectural	   “site-­‐seeing”	   tours.	   Clearly,	   by	   placing	   emphasis	   on	   becoming	   something	  altogether	  different,	  an	  open	  and	  becoming	  city,	  these	  city	  slogans	  and	  tours	  sought	  a	  break	  with	  the	  divided	  Cold	  War	  past	  and	  were	  an	  important	  part	  of	  visualizing	  the	  New	  Berlin.	  Boosters	  also	  promoted	  the	  new	  image	  of	  Berlin	  through	  exhibitions	  of	  hundreds	  of	  models	  and	   sketches	   submitted	   by	   architects	   for	   different	   sites,	   many	   of	   them	   including	   virtual	  reality	  shows	  (Till	  31).	  	  Berlin’s	  obsession	  with	  renewed	  self-­‐representation	  was	  not	  a	  new	  phenomenon	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium	  (Ward	  246).	  The	  city	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  representing	  the	  city	  as	   new:	   the	  modern	   Bauhaus	  movement	   of	   the	   1920s,	   Hitler’s	   Germania,	   new	   visions	   of	  East	  and	  West	  as	  “showcases”	  for	  competing	  political	  ideologies	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Till:	  39-­‐41).	  However,	  unique	  to	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  was	  New	  Berlin’s	  abundant	  use	  of	   televisual	   space.	   With	   the	   aid	   of	   computer	   drafting	   software,	   Berlin	   entered	   into	   the	  virtual	  realm,	  in	  which	  the	  city	  image	  became	  infinitely	  repeatable.	  Even	  historical	  borders	  disappeared:	  20th	  century	  models	  as	  well	  as	  36O-­‐degree,	  panoramic,	   real-­‐time	   images	  of	  the	   city	   were	   available	   (Ward	   248).	   These	   virtual	   images	   undoubtedly	   broadened	   New	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Berlin’s	  audience.	  Focusing	  not	  only	  on	   the	  built	   landscape	  of	  present	  Berlin,	  but	  also	  on	  unrealized	  projections	  of	  its	  past	  and	  future,	  Partner	  für	  Berlin	  had	  succeeded	  in	  distancing	  Berlin’s	  image	  from	  its	  actual	  economic	  and	  political	  context.	  Promotion	  of	  the	  “global	  city”	  image	  campaign	  continued—even	   increased—after	   the	  short-­‐lived	  speculative	  real	  estate	  boom	  in	  Berlin	  had	  turned	  to	  bust	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  (Ward	  244,	  246).	  In	  the	  “City	  of	  Bits,”	  (Ward	   242),	   a	   dematerialized	   virtual	   city	   liberated	   itself	   from	   its	   actual	   infrastructural	  limitations.	  	  Recent	   trends	   seem	   to	   show	   that	   rather	   than	   leading	   to	   a	   decentralization	   and	  disappearance	  of	  the	  city	  center,	  an	  increase	  in	  communication	  technology	  (and	  increase	  in	  the	   mobility	   of	   information)	   has	   actually	   turned	   city	   centers	   themselves	   into	  “communication	  hubs”	   (Huyssen	  60,	  Ward	  242-­‐243).	   Furthermore,	   the	  physical	   shape	   of	  city	  centers	  themselves	  are	  becoming	  highly	  influenced	  by	  images	  communicated	  through	  new	  media.	  Huyssen	  describes	  this	  transformation	  well:	  Indeed,	   the	  city	  as	   center	   is	   far	   from	  becoming	  obsolete.	  But	  as	   city	  center,	  the	   city	   is	   increasingly	   affected	   and	   structured	   by	   our	   culture	   of	   media	  images.	  In	  the	  move	  from	  the	  city	  as	  regional	  or	  national	  center	  of	  production	  to	   the	   city	   as	   international	   center	   of	   communications,	  media,	   and	   services,	  the	  very	   image	  of	   the	  city	   itself	  becomes	  central	   to	   its	   success	   in	  a	  globally	  competitive	  world	  (60).	  	  	  Bringing	  this	  discussion	  back	  to	  Berlin	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium,	  one	  can	  easily	  see	  how	  the	   city	   itself	   was	   “affected	   and	   structured”	   by	   the	   city’s	   projected	   image.	   Berlin’s	   city	  center	  transformed	  from	  an	  open	  field	  into	  commercial	  and	  governmental	  headquarters,	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  becoming	  a	  global	  city.	  The	  commercial	  transformation	  is	  evident	  in	  Potsdamer	  Platz.	   However,	   more	   applicable	   to	   this	   study	   is	   how	   the	   new	   city	   image	   affected	  government	  buildings	  materializing	  in	  the	  city	  center.	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The	  Capital	  City	  Incandescent	   beams	   of	   light	   reflect	   and	   refract,	   generating	   a	   warm	   glow,	   before	  breaking	  free,	  blazing	  through	  the	  hundreds	  of	  clear	  glass	  panels	  comprising	  Berlin’s	  new	  dome	  atop	  the	  Reichstag,	  to	  illuminate	  a	  dark	  blue-­‐black	  Berlin	  sky.	  Rising	  behind	  the	  dome,	  yellow-­‐gold	  construction	  cranes	  reach	   into	   the	  night.	   In	   the	   foreground,	  a	   radiant	  bronze	  quadriga	   triumphantly	   rides	   in	   suspended	   animation,	   atop	   the	   Brandenburg	   Gate.	  Underneath	  this	  image,	  one	  can	  read	  its	  caption:	  “21.	  Mai	  1999:	  DER	  COUNTDOWN	  LÄUFT”	  (the	  countdown	  has	  begun).	  Appearing	  in	  1998,	  Partner	  für	  Berlin	  promoted	  this	  image	  to	  celebrate	  the	  reopening	  of	  the	  Reichstag.	  With	  the	  countdown,	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  Reichstag	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  celebrated	  as	  if	  it	  were	  the	  New	  Year’s	  Eve	  of	  the	  New	  Berlin—whose	  logo	  could	  be	  seen	  at	  the	  bottom	  right	  of	  the	  ad	  in	  red:	  “DAS	  NEUE	  Berlin.”	  Celebrating	  the	  Reichstag’s	   opening	   in	   this	  way	   codified	   a	   break	  with	   the	   recent	   Cold	  War	  past,	   in	   other	  words:	  out	  with	  old	  division,	  in	  with	  new	  unity—Prost	  Neu	  Berlin!	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  “21.	  Mai	  1999:	  DER	  COUNTDOWN	  LÄUFT”	  
Partner	  für	  Berlin,	  Imagekampagne	  1997-­‐1998	  
(c)	  Berlin	  Partner	  GmbH	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However,	  upon	  closer	  examination,	  the	  quadriga’s	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  foreground	  atop	   the	   Brandenburg	   Gate	   (one	   of	   Berlin’s	   oldest	   national	   symbols)	   belies	   the	   image’s	  slogan	  “DAS	  NEUE	  Berlin.”	  The	  quadriga’s	  inclusion	  in	  the	  New	  Berlin	  image	  illustrates	  the	  highly	   complicated	   nature	   of	   representation	   and	   memory	   in	   Berlin.	   Originally	   mounted	  atop	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate	  in	  1793,	  the	  quadriga	  turned	  into	  a	  symbol	  of	  division	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  only	  to	  transform	  into	  a	  symbol	  of	  unification	  after	  the	  Wall’s	  fall.	  If	  the	  Wall	  were	   likened	   to	   a	   zipper,	   signifying	   both	   division	   and	   unity,	   as	   Ladd	   suggests	   (29-­‐30),	  Partner	  für	  Berlin,	  seemed	  to	  be	  using	  the	  quadriga	  as	  the	  pull-­‐tab,	  bringing	  both	  East	  and	  West	  Germany	  together	  to	  create	  a	  united	  platform,	  upon	  which	  construction	  cranes	  could	  build	  the	  New	  Berlin.	  
The	   decision	   to	   move	   the	   capital	   back	   to	   Berlin	   brought	   the	   symbolic	   nature	   of	  architecture	  to	  the	  fore.	  In	  deciding	  the	  form	  the	  New	  Berlin	  would	  take,	  issues	  of	  visibility	  and	   invisibility	   became	   central	   to	   the	   architectural	   debate	   concerning	   Berlin’s	   urban	  landscape	  (Huyssen	  79).	  While	  Berlin	  wanted	  to	  show	  its	  power	  as	  a	  capital	  city,	  it	  was	  still	  haunted	  by	  ghosts	  of	   its	   fascist	  past.	   “Expressing	  government	  power	  without	  pomposity”	  became	   the	  goal	   (Wise,	   “Expressing”).	  Certain	  styles	  were	  avoided,	   such	  as	  neoclassicism	  because	   of	   its	  misuse	   as	   Nazi-­‐architecture—following	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   post-­‐Holocaust	  maxim	  of	  “Never	  Again”	  (Wise,	  “Expressing”).	  As	  Strom	  humorously	  points	  out,	  many	  older	  generation	  Germans	  claimed	  “to	  hear	  military	  marching	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  see	  a	  design	  with	  more	   than	   three	   columns	   in	   a	   row”	   (145).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   federal	   government	   also	  wanted	   new	   buildings	   to	   represent	   unified	   Germany	   as	   a	   powerful	   nation	   in	   Europe.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	  wanted	   to	   break	  with	   the	   functional,	   yet	   quite	   boring,	   style	   of	   its	   capital	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government	  buildings	  in	  Bonn,	  which	  were	  quickly	  constructed	  for	  the	  provisional	  capital,	  and	  sought	  to	  exude	  a	  non-­‐authoritarian,	  non	  fascist	  atmosphere.	  
Government	   officials	   and	   architects	   looked	   to	   the	   image	   of	   the	   New	   Berlin	   to	  circumnavigate	   Berlin’s	   complicated	   memories	   of	   the	   past. 8 	  The	   new	   government	  buildings—housing	   the	   Bundestag,	   the	   Bundesrat,	   and	   the	   Chancellery—were	   planned	  consistent	  with	  the	  image	  of	  the	  New	  Berlin.	  In	  a	  brilliant	  and	  symbolic	  gesture,	  architects	  Axel	   Schultes	  and	  Charlotte	  Frank	  designed	   the	  new	  government	  headquarters	  along	   the	  ribbon-­‐like	  weave	  of	  the	  Spree	  River.	  This	  east-­‐west	  axis	  served	  to	  both	  cancel	  out	  Albert	  Speer’s	  grand	  north-­‐south	  oriented	  Germania,	  as	  well	  as	  symbolically	  reconnect	  East	  and	  West	   Germany	   (Wise,	   “Expressing”).	   Schultes	   and	   Frank	   utilized	   twentieth-­‐century	  materials,	   “smooth	   concrete	   and	   glass,”	   striving	   for	   “a	   playful,	   euphoric	   architecture	   that	  Mr.	  Schultes	  said	  ‘does	  not	  look	  like	  so-­‐called	  fat	  Germany’”	  (Wise,	  “Expressing”).	  To	  avoid	  allusions	   to	   a	   tainted	   neoclassical	   German	   style,	   the	   architects	   made	   their	   columns	  “irregularly	   shaped	   and	   asymmetrically	   placed”	   looking	   more	   “like	   rippling	   panels	   than	  traditional	  pillars...[adding]	  depth	  and	  a	  play	  of	  light	  and	  shadow	  to	  the	  facade,	  while	  also	  providing	   fresh	   iconography	   for	   a	   liberal	   democratic	   state”	   (Wise,	   “Expressing).	   The	  ribbon-­‐like	  curve	  could	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  anti-­‐militaristic	  statement	  for	  some	  modernists,	  like	  Günter	  Behnisch,	  who	  insisted	  that	  a	  “straight	  axis,	  in	  any	  era	  […]	  tended	  to	  encourage	  the	  militaristic	  activity	  of	  marching”	  (Rosenfeld	  195).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This	  was	  limited,	  nevertheless,	  to	  the	  new	  buildings	  constructed	  at	  the	  newly	  created	  government	  complex	  along	  the	  Spreebogen	  (the	  arc	  along	  the	  Spree	  River).	  A	  number	  of	  federal	  ministries	  had	  to	  take	  up	  residence	  in	  “haunted”	  buildings	  used	  by	  Nazi	  and	  GDR	  governments,	  which	  despite	  their	  history,	  proved	  to	  be	  hard	  to	  relegate	  to	  demolition	  (Ladd	  226).	  	  
	  	  
21	  
In	   keeping	   with	   New	   Berlin’s	   democratic	   image,	   security	   went	   underground—literally.	  In	  1996,	  the	  building	  commission	  of	  the	  Bundestag	  requested	  a	  100	  million-­‐mark	  tunnel	   system	  between	   the	  Reichstag	   and	   surrounding	   buildings,	   so	   that	  workers	  would	  not	  have	  to	  meet	  anyone	  who	  had	  not	  passed	  through	  a	  special	  security	  gate	  on	  their	  way	  from	  one	  building	  to	  the	  next	  (“Breite	  Katakombe”	  72).	  Even	  the	  post	  received	  a	  renovated	  tunnel	  system—a	  “	  Printed	  Matter	  Walkway”—expanding	  the	  length	  of	  old	  tunnels	  to	  sixty	  meters,	   so	   that	   documents	   could	  make	   it	   to	   their	   destinations	   securely.	   These	  measures	  were	   partially	   in	   response	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Interior’s	   description	   of	   a	   disruptive	  potential	   of	   anarchists.	   He	   reported	   that	   an	   estimated	   2,500	   “Autonomen”	   (anarchists)	  were	  active	  in	  the	  metropolitan	  area,	  of	  which	  1,000	  were	  available	  at	  a	  moment’s	  notice	  and	   ready	   to	   do	   violence	   (“Breite	   Katakombe”	   75).	   Nonetheless,	   in	   comparison	   to	   other	  buildings,	   such	  as	   the	  Finanzministerium,	  which	   is	  surrounded	  by	  a	   large	  steel	   fence	  (for	  simplicity’s	   sake),	   at	   the	  new	  government	  headquarters	  on	   the	  Spreebogen	   there	  was	  an	  attempt	   to	   keep	  up	   an	   aura	  of	   openness.	  True,	   there	  were	   a	   few	  glass	   and	   steel	   security	  fences	  constructed,	  but	  the	  effort	  was	  made	  to	  create	  places	  for	  the	  public	  space	  in	  front	  of	  important	  buildings,	  such	  as	  before	  the	  Reichstag	  and	  Bundeskanzleramt.	  In	  essence,	  these	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  exhibition	  of	  the	  federal	  government’s	  openness.	  Yet,	  although	  people	  are	   allowed	   to	   pass	   through	   the	   open	   space,	   it	   must	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   government	   did	  institute	  a	  “Bannmeile,”	  or	  “politics	  free	  zone”	  in	  front	  of	  the	  parliament	  and	  other	  federal	  buildings	   (originally	   instituted	   in	   1920	   and	   1955).9	  This	   is	   now	   called	   the	   “befriedigte	  Bezirk,”	  which	  bans	  people	  from	  protesting	  and	  demonstrating	  in	  front	  of	  the	  parliament.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Bringing	  up	  connotations	  to	  Orwellian	  “Double	  Speak”,	  the”	  Bannmeile”	  is	  now	  called	  the	  “befriedigte	  Bezirk.”	  A	  misdemeanor,	  not	  a	  felony,	  now	  awaits	  lawbreakers	  in	  this	  zone.	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Therefore,	   while	   it	   may	   appear	   open	   and	   free,	   there	   are	   still	   certain	   security	  precautions	  that	  have	  been	  taken	  in	  response	  to	  the	  disruptive	  potential	  of	  terrorists	  and	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  government	  workers	  in	  the	  New	  Berlin.	  The	  same	  aura	  of	  openness,	  which	   the	   German	   government	   headquarters	   hoped	   to	   achieve	   through	   transparent	  security	  measures,	  would	  be	  more	  complicated	  for	  the	  Americans	  at	  Pariser	  Platz.	  The	  U.S.	  Embassy	  would	  not	  have	  the	  liberty	  of	  retreating	  behind	  open	  space,	  or	  of	  creating	  such	  a	  modern	   and	   “transparent”	   form	   of	   building	  with	   curved	   smooth	   concrete	   and	   expansive	  glass	  façades.	  The	  location	  of	  the	  embassy	  on	  Pariser	  Platz	  was	  much	  more	  vulnerable	  and	  open,	   and	   also	   required	   to	   follow	   “critical	   reconstruction”	   guidelines,	   including	   a	   stone	  façade,	  which	  affected	  its	  “democratic”	  image.	  
“Critical	  Reconstruction”	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  image	  of	  a	  modern,	  cosmopolitan	  global	  and	  capital	  city,	  “critical	  reconstruction”	  posited	  an	  image	  of	  Berlin	  reconnected	  to	  its	  pre-­‐Cold	  War	  and	  even	  pre-­‐modernist	   pasts.	   According	   to	  Hans	   Stimmann,	   city	   building	   director	   (1991-­‐1996),	   there	  was	  no	  need	   for	  a	  New	  Berlin.	   “We	  do	  not	  have	   to	  reinvent	   the	  city,”	  declared	  Stimmann	  upon	   taking	  his	  post	   in	  1991.	   Instead,	  Stimmann	  promoted	  a	   “return	   [Rückbesinnung]	   to	  the	  European	  city	  building	  tradition”	  (“Heimatkunde	  für	  Neuteutonia”	  48).	  	  
Instead	   of	   the	   “radical	   restructuring”	   favored	   by	   modernists,	   or	   the	   “slavish	  historicism”	  advocated	  by	  conservatives,	  critical	  reconstruction	  was	  supposed	  to	  represent	  a	   “Third	  Way”	   (Strom	  140,	  Murray	  3).	  This	   included	  a	  historically	   inspired	  city	   structure	  interpreted	  with	  contemporary	  architecture.	  Critical	  reconstruction’s	  impact	  on	  individual	  buildings	  is	  hard	  to	  generalize;	  although	  it	  provided	  guidelines	  for	  reconstruction,	  various	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architects	  interpreted	  these	  guidelines.	  In	  this	  sense,	  critical	  reconstruction	  could	  function	  like	   post-­‐modernist	   architecture,	   allowing	   for	   pluralism	   and	   a	   double	   coding	   between	  Berlin’s	   historical	   city	   “footprint”	   and	   contemporary	   architecture,	   creating	   a	   dialectical	  “third	   way.”	   As	   Huyssen	   wittily	   points	   out:	   “In	   their	   antimodernism,	   the	   conservatives	  themselves	   have	   gone	   postmodern”	   (62).	   Here,	   a	   return	   to	   Welsh’s	   interpretation	   of	  pluralism	  in	  postmodernist	  architecture	  is	  insightful.	  Challenging	  modernist	  architecture’s	  universal	   validity	  did	  not	   automatically	   lead	   to	   an	   architecture	  of	   complexity	   (as	   seen	   in	  Stirling’s	  Neue	  Staatsgalerie),	  where	  “in	  one	  and	  the	  same	  building,	  several	  paradigms	  are	  articulated—and	  not	  mixed	  together	  so	  that	  none	  can	  be	  recognized	  but	  clearly	  displayed	  with	   all	   their	   contrasts	   and	   contradictions”	   (Welsch	   34).	   Instead,	   a	   turn	   away	   from	  modernist	  architecture	  could	  also	  manifest	  itself	  as	  a	  “potpourri	  style”	  in	  which	  “anything	  goes,”	  or	  in	  a	  “one	  way	  street	  to	  the	  past”	  traditional	  style	  (34).	  	  
Pariser	   Platz	   provides	   good	   examples	   of	   various	   interpretations	   of	   critical	  reconstruction	  guidelines.10	  Modernist	  Günter	  Behnisch’s	  Akademie	  der	  Künste	  broke	   the	  material	  (stone)	  guidelines	  in	  its	  glass	  front	  façade.	  When	  viewed	  against	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  square,	  this	  provides	  for	  a	  double	  coding.	  Deconstructivist	  Frank	  Gehry’s	  DZ	  Bank	  created	  an	   interesting	   interior-­‐exterior	   contradiction:	   an	   exterior	   closely	   following	   critical	  reconstructionist	   guidelines,	  with	   an	   interior	   dominated	   by	   a	  massive	   abstract	   glass	   and	  steel	   structure.	  Neorationalist	  Paul	  Kleihues’	  Haus	  Sommer	  and	  Haus	  Liebermann	  can	  be	  seen	   as	   highly	   historically	   influenced.	   Hotel	   Adlon	   was	   most	   historically	   influenced,	  becoming	  almost	  a	  replica	  (with	  one	  extra	   floor)	  of	   its	  pre-­‐War	  historical	  predecessor.	   In	  these	  buildings	  we	  can	  see	  a	  “one	  way	  street	  to	  the	  past.”	  Finally,	  Moore	  Ruble	  Yudell’s	  U.S.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  These	  guidelines	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  detail	  in	  Section	  II,	  “Inspired	  by	  the	  19th	  Century.”	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Embassy	  challenged	  the	  maximum	  opening	  size	  restrictions	  with	  a	  slit	  in	  the	  Pariser	  Platz	  façade,	  and	  tried	  to	  combine	  “transparent	  security”	  with	  a	  critical	  reconstructionist	  stone	  façade.	   In	   an	   examination	   of	   these	   buildings,	   it	   becomes	   evident	   that	   most	   of	   the	   non-­‐historically	   based	   constructions	   had	   to	   either	   hide	   elements	   that	   diverged	   from	   the	  historically	  influenced	  architecture,	  like	  the	  playful	  postmodernist	  influences	  on	  the	  inside	  of	   Gehry’s	   DZ	   Bank,	   or	   challenge	   the	   guidelines,	   requiring	   special	   permission	   to	   diverge	  from	   the	   historically	   based	   guidelines—such	   as	   Behnisch’s	   modernist	   glass	   façade,	   or	  MRY’s	   postmodernist	   opening.	   Thus,	   while	   allowing	   for	   contemporary	   architecture,	  historically	  based	  architecture	  caused	  less	  resistance	  to	  critical	  reconstruction	  guidelines.	  	  In	  the	  position	  of	  city	  building	  director,	  Stimmann	  could	  expand	  his	  influence	  from	  individual	  building	  plans	  to	  a	  master	  plan,	  which	  he	  entitled	  “Plannwerk	  Innenstadt.”	  In	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  city	  structure,	  critical	  reconstruction	  revealed	  its	  highly	  conservative	  tone.	  Whereas	  specific	  buildings	  could	  include	  contemporary	  architecture,	  the	  form	  of	  city	  plan	   could	   not.	   The	   city	   “footprint”	   was	   based	   on	   historical	   analysis	   of	   the	   street	   plan	  before	  modernist	   influence.	   Stimmann	   viewed	  modernist	   city	   planning	   as	   destructive:	   It	  had	  “consciously	  declared	  war	  on	   the	  surviving	   texture	  of	   the	  city.	   [Modernists]	  replaced	  the	   density	   of	   the	   old	   city	   with	   spatial	   disintegration”	   (Till	   45).	   Historical	   aerial	  photography	   and	   city	   plans	   were	   analysed	   to	   rediscover	   what	   Stimmann	   called	   the	  historical	   “texture	   of	   the	   city”	   (Till	   47).	   As	   a	   guide	   to	   recreating	   this	   historical	   texture,	  “black	  plans”	  were	  created,	  which	  were	  black	  and	  white	  maps	  showing	  Berlin’s	  historical	  “footprint”	  at	  specific	  moments	  of	  history,	  for	  example	  1940,	  1953,	  and	  1993.	  When	  placed	  next	   to	   each	   other,	   they	   reveal	   a	   disappearing	   texture	   of	   the	   city,	   not	   only	   through	  destruction	   during	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   but	   also	   by	   modernist	   planning.	   Here	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Stimmann’s	  selective	  use	  of	  history	  becomes	  evident.	  Modernist	  construction	  does	  not	  even	  show	  up	  on	   the	  plans,	   and	  appears	  white,	   blending	   into	   the	   voids	   caused	  by	  destruction	  from	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   In	   place	   of	   modernist	   decentralized	   designs,	   Stimmann	  advocated	  a	  centred	  European	  city,	  with	  height	  restrictions	  on	  buildings,	  and	  requirements	  for	   dense,	   diverse-­‐use	   city	   planning.	   As	   Huyssen	   points	   out,	   “[t]he	   hidden	   object	   of	  Stimmann’s	   moralizing	   protest	   is	   Weimar	   Berlin,”	   which	   “defined	   its	   modernity	   as	  quintessentially	   ‘American’”	   (62).	  To	   critical	   reconstructionists,	   only	   the	  buildings	  with	   a	  pre-­‐Cold	  War	  history	  fit	  into	  the	  “permanent	  gene	  structure	  of	  the	  city”	  (Till	  46).	  This	  has	  led	   to	  much	  criticism.	  For	  example	  Daniel	  Libeskind	  stated,	   “Berlin	  doesn’t	   stand	   for	  one	  history	  but	   for	  many,	   including	   the	  history	  of	  people	  who	  have	  been	  wiped	  out.	  This	   is	  a	  concerted	  attempt	  to	  write	  a	  revisionist	  history	  of	  the	  city	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  new	  mood	  in	  Germany	  since	  reunification”	  (Neill	  93).	  
	  Whereas	  the	  emergence	  of	  postmodernist	  architecture	  in	  West	  Germany	  during	  the	  late	   1970s	   and	   1980s	  made	   its	   biggest	   impact	   by	   refuting	   the	   link	   between	   politics	   and	  aesthetics,	   (and	   thus	   liberating	   architects	   from	   modernist	   maxims	   and	   “taboos”	   about	  historically	  inspired	  architectural	  styles),	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  “critical	  reconstruction”	  in	   the	   1990s	   subsequently	   warped	   postmodernism’s	   liberating	   forces	   into	   authoritarian	  guidelines,	   proving	   that	   politics	   and	   aesthetics	   were	   indeed	   still	   closely	   intertwined	   in	  Berlin.	  After	  the	  particular	  strand	  of	  postmodernists	  (neo-­‐rationalists)	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  historically	  inspired	  architecture	  in	  Berlin,	  neo-­‐traditionalists	  such	  as	  Hans	  Stimmann	  were	  able	  to	  turn	  anti-­‐modernist	  feelings	  into	  city	  guidelines	  for	  reconstruction.	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II.	  PLANNING	  AND	  NEGOTIATION	  PHASES	  Although	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   would	   be	   met	   with	   increasing	   criticism	   following	   its	  1998	  security	  regulations,	   the	  original	  planning	  stages	  (1991-­‐1998)	  were	  received	  rather	  positively	  in	  Berlin.	  This	  is	  undoubtedly	  because	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  had	  something	  to	  offer	  both	   global	   city	   visions	   and	   critical	   reconstruction	   planning.	   Visions	   of	   the	   future	   and	  memories	  of	  the	  past	  not	  only	  answered	  questions	  as	  to	  why	  the	  embassy	  should	  be	  built	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  but	  also	  where	  it	  would	  be	  located,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  what	  form	  it	  would	  take.	  However,	   increased	   U.S.	   security	   regulations	   of	   1998	   disrupted	   both	   visions	   of	   a	   New	  Berlin	   and	   historically	   inspired	   critical	   reconstruction	   guidelines.	   Berlin	   politicians	   met	  suggested	  U.S.	   security	  measures	  with	   great	   resistance,	   leading	   to	   a	   political	   standoff,	   in	  which	  Berlin	  stood	  up	  to	  its	  former	  protective	  power.	  
Into	  the	  21st	  Century	  Why	   did	   the	   United	   States	   need	   a	   new	   embassy	   in	   the	   first	   place?	   In	   essence,	   it	  already	  had	  two	  centers	  for	  dealing	  with	  embassy	  related	  matters:	  the	  former	  “U.S.	  mission	  to	  East	  Berlin”	  in	  the	  eastern	  section	  of	  Berlin	  Mitte	  on	  Neustädtischen	  Kirchstraße	  and	  the	  former	  “U.S.	  Mission	  to	  Berlin”	  in	  the	  western	  suburb	  of	  Dahlem,	  the	  former	  headquarters	  of	  U.S.	  military	  operations,	  located	  about	  a	  dozen	  kilometers	  from	  Pariser	  Platz.	  Yet	  in	  this	  division,	  even	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  relic	  of	  a	  divided	  city.	  Obviously,	  combining	  these	   two	  centers	   into	  one	   larger	  embassy	  would	  help	   create	  a	  break	  with	   the	  Cold	  War	  past	  as	  well	  as	  give	  the	  United	  States	  a	  more	  visible	  presence	  in	  Berlin’s	  emerging	  center.	  	  
The	   proposal	   to	   build	   a	   new	   embassy	   in	   Berlin’s	   emerging	   city	   center	   seemed	   to	  satisfy	  politicians	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  For	  Americans,	  it	  represented	  a	  continued	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partnership	  with	  Germany	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  also	  a	  base	  within	  the	  growing	  European	  Union.	  For	  the	  Berliners,	  it	  acted	  like	  a	  “Thank	  You”	  to	  their	  former	  power,	  and	  supported	  a	  strong	  united	   German	   image.	   International	   government	   representation	   and	   partnership	   were	  attractive,	  especially	  since	  Germany	  seemed	  to	  be	  taking	  two	  detours	  on	   its	  way	  towards	  globalization:	   first	   becoming	   the	   capital	   of	   a	   strong	   federal	   nation,	   and	   then	   becoming	   a	  strong	  national	  leader	  in	  Europe.	  The	  embassy	  would	  become	  the	  newest	  U.S.	  consulate	  in	  Europe,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  reinforce	  Germany’s	  role	  as	  a	  leader	  on	  the	  continent.11	  Concerning	  economics,	   it	  would	  also	  not	  hurt	   to	   receive	   foreign	   investment	   in	   the	   city	   center,	   as	   the	  German	  economy	  was	  struggling.	  As	   the	   following	  section	  will	  show,	  both	  U.S.	  and	  Berlin	  politicians	   evoked	   memories	   of	   a	   special	   historical	   relationship	   to	   project	   visions	   of	   a	  continued,	  if	  newly	  defined,	  partnership.	  	  
As	   President	   Clinton’s	   “Address	   to	   the	   People	   of	   Berlin”	   in	   1994	  made	   clear,	   the	  United	   States	   wanted	   to	   position	   itself	   within	   the	   New	   Berlin—the	   capital	   of	   a	   unified	  Germany—and	  sought	  to	  expand	  its	  power	  throughout	  Europe	  via	  Germany,	  and	  then	  into	  a	  limitless	  future:	  Within	  a	  few	  years,	  an	  American	  president	  will	  visit	  a	  Berlin	  that	  is	  again	  the	  seat	  of	  your	  government.	  And	  I	  pledge	  to	  you	  today	  a	  new	  American	  embassy	  will	   also	   stand	   in	   Berlin.	   (Applause.)	   […]	   But	   in	   our	   own	   time,	   you,	  courageous	   Berliners,	   have	   again	   made	   the	   Brandenburg	   [Gate]	   what	   its	  builders	  meant	   it	   to	  be,	  a	  gateway.	   (Applause.)	  Now,	   together,	  we	  can	  walk	  through	   that	   gateway	   to	   our	   destiny,	   to	   a	   Europe	   united,	   united	   in	   peace,	  united	   in	   freedom,	   united	   in	   progress	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   history.	   Nothing	  will	   stop	   us.	   All	   things	   are	   possible.	   “Nichts	   wird	   uns	   aufhalten.	   Alles	   ist	  möglich.	  Berlin	  ist	  frei.”	  (Applause.)	  Berlin	  is	  free.	  (Applause.)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Ironically,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  already	  provided	  the	  first	  demolition	  work	  of	  the	  old	  building	  site	  by	  helping	  bomb	  Pariser	  Platz	  to	  pieces	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  
	  	  
28	  
Switching	   into	  German,	   Clinton	  used	   a	   powerful	   rhetorical	   technique,	   evoking	  Kennedy’s	  infamous	   sentence	   in	   German.	  12	  Clinton	   tied	   this	   history	   to	   visions	   of	   a	   limitless	   future,	  which	  seemed	  to	  correlate	  with	  the	  limitless	  representation	  of	  Berlin’s	  “becoming”	  image.	  Together,	   the	  U.S.	  and	  Germany	  would	  walk	   through	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate	   to	  a	  common	  destiny.	   Clinton’s	   speech	   demonstrates,	   that	   the	   United	   States’	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   approach	  included	  widening	  their	  influence	  in	  Europe	  through	  Berlin.	  
	   The	  Mayor	  of	  Berlin,	  Eberhard	  Diepgen,	  spoke	  at	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  Allied	  Museum	  in	  Dahlem	  (1994),	  confirming	  Berlin’s	  intention	  to	  continue	  its	  partnership	  with	  the	  United	  States:	  	  [The	  museum	  ]	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  our	  gratitude	  and	  more	  than	  just	  a	  museum	  of	  a	  receding	   past:	   it	   is	   a	   symbol	   of	   the	   victory	   of	   freedom	   and	   is	   one	   of	   the	  foundations	  for	  a	  friendship	  which	  we	  will	  maintain	  and	  strengthen	  […]	  We	  will	   always	   gratefully	   commemorate	   this	   chapter	   of	   history	   and	   these	  achievements,	   not	   only	   in	   the	  museums	   and	  monuments,	   but	   also	   through	  the	  lively	  exchange	  in	  a	  newly	  constructed	  partnership	  for	  security,	  properly	  redefined	  with	  new	  traditions,	  and	  above	  all	  in	  personal	  relations.	  (Verheyen	  107).	  	  Diepgen’s	   statement	   emphasized	   gratitude	   for	   a	   historical	   relationship,	   commemorating	  the	  Cold	  War	  past	  to	  project	  a	  future	  partnership	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  term	  “newly	  constructed	  partnership”	  seems	  to	  hint	  at	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  break	  with	  Cold	  War	  power	  relations.	   In	   using	   the	   rather	   vague	   but	   significant	   terms	   “properly	   redefined	   with	   new	  traditions”	   to	   describe	   the	   partnership,	   Diepgen	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   Berlin	   no	   longer	  needed	   the	   United	   States	   as	   a	   protective	   or	   security	   force.	   “New	   traditions”	   most	   likely	  involved	  a	  more	  confident	  Berlin	  and	  a	  less	  security	  involved	  United	  States.	  However,	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  In	  Clinton’s	  German	  phrase	  “Berlin	  ist	  frei”	  we	  can	  see	  allusions	  to	  Reagan’s	  “Es	  gibt	  nur	  ein	  Berlin”	  (1987)	  and	  Kennedy’s	  “Ich	  bin	  ein	  Berliner”	  (1963).	  Together,	  the	  three	  phrases	  show	  the	  special	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Berlin,	  and	  reinforce	  U.S.	  support	  for	  a	  “free”	  and	  united	  Berlin.	  
	  	  
29	  
“newly	   constructed	   partnership	   for	   security”	   would	   prove	   harder	   than	   anticipated	   to	  realize	  in	  Berlin,	  as	  complicated	  negotiations	  concerning	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  confirmed.	  	  
As	  Christoph	  Stözl,	  director	  of	  the	  German	  Historical	  Museum,	  remarked,	  the	  Allied	  Museum,	   created	   in	   Dahlem	   (in	   former	   U.S.	   military	   headquarters),	   was	   a	   “museum	   of	  gratitude”	   (Verheyen	   107).	   Partner	   für	   Berlin’s	   image	   for	   the	   New	   Berlin	   in	   1987-­‐1988	  picked	   up	   on	   this	   theme.	   However,	   gratitude	   for	   the	   past	   did	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   a	  continuation	  of	  historical	  power	  relations.	  Till’s	  observation	  into	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  New	  Berlin,	   that	   “every	   ‘new’	   finds	   legitimation	   through	   what	   it	   excludes”	   (55),	   caused	   a	  predicament	   for	   the	   United	   States.	   As	   a	   former	   occupational	   and	   “protective”	   power,	   its	  most	   involved	   history	   in	   a	   divided	   Cold	  War	   Berlin	   took	   place	   during	   a	   time	   period	   the	  “New	  Berlin”	  was	  consciously	  trying	  to	  free	  itself	  from.	  	  	  An	  examination	  of	  the	  image	  campaign	  created	  by	  Partner	  für	  Berlin	  (1997-­‐1998)	  helps	  illustrate	  how	  city	  boosters	  thought	  the	  United	  States	  could	  fit	  into	  “DAS	  NEUE	  Berlin.”	  The	  motto	  of	  the	  campaign,	  written	  in	  English,	  was	  obviously	  catered	  towards	  the	  United	  States	   (and	  Great	  Britain	  and	  France);	   running	  across	   the	   center	  of	   the	   image,	   the	  motto	  reads:	   “THANK	  YOU:	  No	   new	  Berlin	  without	   you,”	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   Berlin	   Airlift.	   Red,	  white,	   and	   blue	   provide	   the	   basic	   color	   scheme	   of	   the	   image.	   The	   quadriga	   glows	   as	   a	  symbol	  of	  German	  unification.	  Construction	  cranes,	   symbolizing	   the	  new,	  cast	   silhouettes	  across	  the	  dark	  blue	  sky.	  In	  the	  center	  of	  the	  image,	  we	  see	  a	  departure	  from	  red,	  white,	  and	  blue	   into	   turquois	   and	   then	   green.13	  Almost	   matching	   the	   quadriga’s	   turquois	   color,	   the	  green	   cube	   atop	   the	   Debis	   Tower,	   then	   owned	   by	   Daimler-­‐Chrysler,	   at	   Potsdamer	   Platz	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This	  departure	  from	  Allied	  colors	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  Germany’s	  historical	  symbol	  of	  unification,	  the	  quadriga,	  and	  a	  symbol	  for	  commercial	  power,	  the	  Debis	  Tower.	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shines	  like	  an	  economic	  beacon	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  image.	  Interesting	  to	  note:	  at	  this	  time,	  German	  company	  Daimler	  had	  merged	  with	  the	  American	  Chrysler	   in	  hopes	  of	  creating	  a	  powerful	  transatlantic	  automobile	  alliance.	  Thus,	  the	  U.S.	  presence	  in	  the	  New	  Berlin	  was	  represented	  more	  as	  a	  business	  partnership	  than	  a	  security	  one.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  “THANK	  YOU:	  No	  new	  Berlin	  without	  you”	  
Partner	  für	  Berlin,	  Imagekampagne	  1997-­‐1998	  	  
(c)	  Berlin	  Partner	  GmbH	  	   In	   the	  same	  advertisement,	   juxtaposed	  with	  the	  New	  Berlin	   image,	  a	   famous	  black	  and	  white	  photograph	  of	  an	  Allied	  “Candy	  Bomber”	  used	  during	  the	  airlift	  seems	  to	  relegate	  the	  U.S.	  security	  presence	  in	  Germany	  to	  the	  past.	  With	  its	  lack	  of	  color,	  the	  Allied	  aircraft	  appears	   to	   be	   flying	   the	   Allied	   protective	   security	   presence	   away	   from	   the	   colorful	  New	  Berlin,	   and	   into	  history;	  perhaps	   to	   the	  newly	   created	  Allied	  museum	   in	  Dahlem,	   located	  over	  a	  dozen	  kilometers	   from	  Pariser	  Platz.	   In	  Berlin’s	  commemoration	  and	  gratitude	   for	  the	   past,	   the	   United	   States	   security	   presence	   could	   be	   relegated	   to	   history.	   Not	   yet	  completed,	   because	   of	   a	   transnational	   debate	   over	   security	   regulations,	   the	   “future	   U.S.	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Embassy	  Berlin”	  at	  Pariser	  Platz	  remains	  just	  outside	  of	  the	  photograph’s	  view,	  overlooked	  in	  its	  zoom	  towards	  Potsdamer	  Platz,	  the	  aspiring	  new	  commercial	  center	  of	  Berlin.	  
Inspired	  by	  the	  19th	  Century	  Although	  Clinton	  had	  promised	  Berliners	  that	  a	  “new	  American	  embassy	  […]	  would	  stand	  in	  Berlin”	  (Clinton),	  this	  new	  embassy	  would	  find	  itself	  limited	  in	  creative	  expression.	  By	   choosing	   a	   central	   position	   in	   the	   city,	   Pariser	   Platz,	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   fell	   under	   the	  doctrine	   of	   critical	   reconstruction.	   When	   it	   came	   to	   building	   in	   the	   center	   of	   Post-­‐Wall	  Berlin,	  not	  all	  things	  were	  possible.	  Plans	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  were	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  doctrine	  of	   critical	   reconstruction,	  which	   reached	  out	   to	   a	   specific	  Berlin	  past—most	  importantly	  here,	  a	  pre-­‐Cold	  War,	  and	  pre-­‐Weimar	  modernist	  past.	  
For	   the	   “critical	   reconstructionists”	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   U.S.	   had	   a	   prior	   presence	   on	  Pariser	  Platz	   likely	   increased	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   its	   claim	   for	   central	   space	  within	   the	   city.	  The	  Blücher	  Palace	  was	  bought	  by	  the	  U.S.	  in	  1930.	  Returning	  Pariser	  Platz	  to	  its	  pre-­‐WWII	  location	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  return	  to	  normalcy:	  the	  Cold	  War	  Allies—the	  U.S.,	  France,	  and	  Great	  Britain—were	  returning	  their	  embassies	  to	  pre-­‐Cold	  War	  sites.	  An	  overriding	  theme	  of	  the	  regulations,	  which	  are	  described	  below,	  shows	  an	  emphasis	  on	  unity—parts	  coming	  together	   to	  make	   a	  whole	   based	   on	   the	   rules	   and	   regulations	   of	   city	   planning.	   This	   is	   a	  major	   theme	   in	   Stimmann’s	   implementation	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   critical	   reconstruction.	  Because	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  history	  of	  division	  (and	  the	  perceived	  fracture	  brought	  about	  by	  modernist	  architecture’s	  disregard	  for	  the	  historic	  city	  plan),	  critical	  reconstruction	  seeks	  wholeness	   in	   the	   1990s,	   and	   the	   key	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   past.	   This	   past,	   however,	   is	   so	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distant	   that	   its	   practical	   implementation	   in	   a	   struggling	   economy	   required	   using	  contemporary	  architecture	  inspired	  by	  pre-­‐Weimar	  architecture.	  
“Critical	  Reconstruction”	  Guidelines	  Except	   for	   the	   Brandenburg	   Gate	   (and	   a	   few	   halls	   of	   the	   Academy	   of	   Arts)	   no	  remnants	   of	   the	   pre-­‐war	   buildings	   on	   Pariser	   Platz	   remained.	   Thus,	   the	   first	   step	   to	  “critically	   reconstructing”	   Pariser	   Platz	   necessitated	   a	   detailed	   historical	   analysis	   of	   the	  spatial	  form	  (Raumgestalt)	  of	  the	  square,	  its	  individual	  pre-­‐war	  buildings,	  and	  the	  greater	  whole	  created	  by	  their	   interaction.	  Bruno	  Flierl	  and	  Walter	  Rolfes	  were	  commissioned	  to	  recommend	  spatial	  and	  material	  regulations	  for	  new	  construction,	  based	  on	  their	  historical	  analysis.	  	  
The	  result,	  entitled	  “Gutachten	  zur	  Gestaltung	  der	  Gebäude	  am	  Pariser	  Platz”	  (1993),	  included	   recommended	   spatial	   and	   surface-­‐material	   guidelines	   for	   the	   square.	   The	   goal	  was	  stated	  as	  follows:	  “The	  Pariser	  Platz	  should	  be	  reconstructed	  in	  its	  prewar	  spatial	  form	  as	   an	   enclosed	   square:	   structured	   in	   parcels,	   partly	   with	   new	   uses,	   and	   in	   new	  contemporary	  architecture.”	  14	  Vertically,	  because	  Flierl	  and	  Rolfes	  based	  their	  analysis	  on	  the	  historical	  buildings’	  palazzo	  influenced	  style,	  new	  construction	  was	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  zones:	  lower	  (5.70	  m	  high),	  middle	  (16.70	  m	  =	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate)	  and	  upper	  (30	  m—as	  seen	  from	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  square).	  The	  eave	  height	  was	  set	  at	  20	   meters.	   Horizontally,	   based	   on	   the	   palazzo	   style,	   all	   new	   construction	   should	   be	  symmetrical,	  with	  nearly	  same-­‐sized	  entrances,	  and	  total	  openings	  (window	  and	  doors)	  of	  the	  façades	  should	  not	  exceed	  30%.	  All	  entrances	  should	  be	  smaller	  than	  70	  square	  meters,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Unless	  otherwise	  noted,	  all	  translations	  of	  works	  cited	  in	  German	  are	  my	  own.	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so	   as	   not	   to	   compete	   with	   the	   gateway	   function	   of	   the	   Brandenburg	   Gate.	   Concerning	  materials,	  “matte	  mineral	  surfaces	  and	  a	  coloring	  between	  light	  ocher-­‐yellow	  and	  brown”	  were	  advised.	  Mirrored	  glass	  was	  to	  be	  avoided	  to	  ensure	  the	  enclosed	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  square.	  
Several	  themes	  emerge	  as	  guiding	  principles	  throughout	  Flierl	  and	  Rolfes’	  analysis.	  First,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  historic	  “Raumgestalt”	  of	  the	  square:	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts	  was	  greater	   than	   the	   individual	   buildings	   in	   themselves.	   To	   achieve	   this	   in	   contemporary	  architecture,	   regulations	  were	   necessary.	   According	   to	   Flierl	   and	  Rolfes,	   these	   suggested	  regulations	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  “interference”	  or	  “intervention”	  into	  the	  “creativity	  of	  individual	   parts”	   but	   rather	   as	   guidelines	   to	   reach	   a	   desired	   whole:	   “not	   a	   corset,	   but	  consensus	   for	   form”	  (Flierl	  and	  Rolfes).	  Secondly,	  because	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate	  was	  the	  only	  structure	  that	  remained,	  Flierl	  and	  Rolfes	  decided	  that	  the	  gate	  should	  be	  the	  measure	  of	  all	  the	  other	  buildings.	  Regulations	  should	  be	  based	  on	  the	  historical	  proportions	  of	  the	  individual	  buildings	  in	  relationship	  to	  the	  Gate.	  Thirdly,	  although	  calling	  for	  contemporary	  architecture,	   the	   image	  and	   form	  of	   the	  buildings	   should	  be	  based	  on	   the	  historical	   form	  that	  dominated	  the	  square:	  the	  palazzo.	  
In	   suggesting	   vertical	   dimensions	   (based	   on	   the	   historical	   buildings,	   divided	   into	  three	   zones)	   and	  material	   guidelines	   and	   color	   specifications,	   these	   regulations	   showed	  their	  restrictiveness	  of	  contemporary	  architecture.	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  guidelines	  calling	  for	  a	  return	  to	  the	  street	  plan	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  they	  also	  influenced	  the	  image	  of	  the	  buildings.	  Basically,	   Flierl	   and	   Rolfes’	   guidelines	   called	   for	   stone	   or	   plaster-­‐covered	   cubes	   colored	  ocher-­‐yellow	  or	  gray.	  This	  form,	  it	  may	  be	  noted,	  could	  essentially	  resemble	  a	  multitude	  of	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blandly	  colored	  square	  buildings—including	  offices,	  or	  prisons,	  a	  resemblance	  that	  would	  be	   exploited	   by	   embassy	   critiques	   throughout	   its	   construction	   and	   upon	   its	   completion.	  Nonetheless,	   Flierl	   and	   Rolfes’	   plan	   was	   based	   on	   the	   historical	   form	   of	   the	   Palazzo:	  “touching	  rows	  of	  Palazzi”	  (Flierl	  and	  Rolfes).	  	  Flierl	   and	   Rolfes’	   set	   of	   guidelines	   were	   the	   third	   commissioned	   by	   the	   Berlin’s	  building	   department	   of	   the	   government.	   Previous	   guidelines	   had	   not	   called	   for	   such	  historically	  influenced	  regulations	  of	  the	  individual	  buildings	  themselves,	  rather	  just	  for	  the	  city	  structure.	  Although	  also	  calling	  for	  contemporary	  architecture	  and	  a	  historically	  based	  form	   of	   the	   square,	   suggested	   guidelines	   prepared	   by	   Flierl	   and	   Rolfes’	   were	   more	  influenced	  by	  historical	  form.	  Dieter	  Hoffmann	  Axthelm’s	  suggested	  guidelines,	  for	  example,	  argued	   against	   historically	   influenced	   façades	   and	   materials:	   “The	   level	   on	   which	   the	  reconstruction	   of	   Berlin’s	   historical	   center	   is	   to	   be	   accomplished	   is	   not	   that	   of	   historical	  images	  (historical	  buildings,	  façades),	  it	  is	  in	  the	  city	  structure.	  The	  visible,	  the	  architecture,	  must	  therefore	  not	  be	  historical,	  but	  contemporary”	  (Hamm).	  Hildebrand	  Machleidt,	  Walter	  Stepp	  and	  Wolfgang	  Schäche	  also	  argued	  against	  the	  “historicizing”	  of	  the	  architecture	  and	  called	  for	  contemporary	  “architectural	  language”	  (Hamm).	  
Nonetheless,	   under	   Stimmann’s	   supervision,	   the	   government	  decided	   to	   use	   Flierl	  and	  Rolfes’	  draft	  as	  guidelines	   for	  devising	   the	  development	  plan	   I-­‐200	  (1995,	   revised	   in	  1996).	  Most	  of	  Flierl	  and	  Rolfes’	  recommendations	  were	  followed;	  only	  a	  few	  specifics	  were	  changed.	  This	  included	  contradictorily	  allowing	  for	  an	  increased	  maximum	  opening	  volume	  from	   thirty	   to	   fifty	   percent	   of	   the	   façade,	   yet	   restricting	   the	   largest	   opening	   in	   size	   from	  seventy	   to	   forty	   cubic	  meters.	   Changes	   also	   allowed	   for	   another	   floor,	   with	   a	  maximum	  height	   of	   twenty	  meters	   above	   the	   eave	   height,	   set	   by	   the	  Brandenburg	  Gate.	   This	   latter	  
	  	  
35	  
change	  has	  been	  condemned	  by	  some	  critics	  as	   leading	   to	  poorly	  proportioned	  buildings	  (Hamm).	  	  
Because	  of	  its	  insistence	  on	  form	  and	  structure	  and	  image,	  the	  following	  images	  are	  provided	   to	   help	   illustrate	   the	   process.	   Figure	   3,	   created	   by	   Flierl	   and	  Rolfes,	   shows	   the	  vertical	   and	   horizontal	   measurements	   of	   Pariser	   Platz	   2,	   with	   the	   Gate	   as	   a	   measuring	  guide.	   Figure	   4	   juxtaposes	   Flierl	   and	   Rolfes’	   historical	   study	   with	   plans	   for	   the	   new	  construction,	  including	  façades.	  The	  only	  two	  buildings	  requiring	  special	  allowances	  were	  the	   Akademie	   der	   Künste	   by	   Behnisch	   because	   of	   its	   full	   glass	   and	  metal	   façade	   (Fig.	   4:	  second	  building	   from	  the	   left	   in	   the	  bottom	  row)	  and	  Moore	  Ruble	  Yudell’s	  U.S.	  Embassy	  (Fig.	  4:	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate).	  	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  “Pariser	  Platz	  2”	  	  





Figure	  4:	  “Chronik	  der	  Parzellen”	  
Senatsverwaltung	  für	  Stadtsentwicklung	  	  
Moore	  Ruble	  Yudell’s	  Initial	  Design	  Using	  an	  aerial	  photograph	  from	  the	  1930s,	  Stimmann	  himself	  led	  hopeful	  American	  architects	  on	  a	  tour	  of	  Pariser	  Platz	  on	  April	  5,	  1995.	  In	  the	  pages	  of	  his	  journal,	  architect	  John	   Ruble	   wrote	   about	   his	   experience	   with	   the	   Senatsbaudirektor:	   “As	   he	   outlined	   the	  basic	   aims	   of	   his	   department—to	   reconstruct	   the	   historic	   plan	   using	   contemporary	  architecture—Stimmann	   seemed	   not	   to	   realize	   that	   he	   was	   preaching	   to	   the	   choir.	   But	  while	  Americans	   there	  accepted	   implicitly	   the	  value	  of	   a	  historic	   city	  plan,	   the	   issue	  was	  deeply	  divisive	   for	  Berliners”	   (Koffka	  177).	  As	   is	   evident	   in	  his	   statement,	  Ruble	   showed	  that	  he	  and	  his	  firm	  were	  dedicated	  to	  following	  critical	  reconstruction	  guidelines.	  Another	  statement	  towards	  the	  conclusion	  of	  his	  dairy	  entry	  confirms	  the	  architects’	  consensus	  in	  recreating	  the	  “Raumgestalt”	  of	  the	  square:	  	  We	   made	   a	   decision	   that	   day	   of	   the	   tour	   that	   the	   embassy’s	   symbolic	  message—the	   dynamic	   pluralist	   American	   democracy,	   the	   presence	   of	   a	  vigilant	  world	  power—would	  all	   find	  expression	  within	   its	  place	   as	  part	   of	  the	   larger	   whole.	   Indeed,	   the	   political	   point	   of	   the	   building	   on	   the	   Pariser	  Platz	   site	   is	   to	   declare	   our	   alliance	   in	   the	   rebirth	   of	  Berlin	   as	   a	   democratic	  capital	  (Koffka	  177).	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To	   represent	   the	   dynamic	   pluralist	   democracy,	   MRY	   sought	   inspiration	   in	   the	  Enlightenment	  era	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  choice	  was	  well	  justified:	  it	  was	  the	  period	  in	  which	   the	   Brandenburg	   Gate	  was	   built	   and	   also	  when	   the	  United	   States	   of	   America	  was	  founded.	   The	   entrance	   alluded	   to	   rotunda	   designs	   by	   Thomas	   Jefferson.	   Inscribed	   in	   the	  rotunda	  entrance,	  one	  can	  read	  the	  opening	  lines	  of	  the	  constitution.	  Original	  designs	  also	  included	   “the	   Lodge”	   in	   the	   inner	   courtyard	   of	   the	   building.	   This	   was	   intended	   to	   be	   a	  dining	   and	   conference	   center.	   According	   to	   Ruble,	   the	   courtyard	   and	   lodge’s	   “form	   and	  scale”	   were	  meant	   to	   “recall	   both	   the	   iconic	   importance	   of	   the	   American	   house	   and	   the	  great	  federal	  nature	  of	  our	  natural	  parks”	  (Koffka	  187).	  The	  embassy	  also	  followed	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  including	  an	  impressive	  collection	  of	  artwork,	  including	  Gee’s	  Bend	  Quilters,	  “a	  community	   of	   quilters	  who	   grew	  up	   in	   the	   former	   slave	   district	   of	   their	   ancestors;”	   two	  large	  star	  motif	  paintings	  by	  Sol	  Lewitt;	  and	  a	  famous	  relic	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  (U.S.	  Mission	  Germany	  1).	  	  
However,	   the	   embassy	   seems	   to	   have	   concealed	   much	   of	   this	   representation	   of	  “dynamic	   pluralist	   democracy”	   on	   the	   inside.	   On	   the	   exterior,	   the	   building	   sought	   out	  Enlightenment	  era	  and	  contemporary	  architectural	  citations.	  This	  design	  left	  out	  references	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  history	  as	  a	  Cold	  War	  power,	  fitting	  in	  well	  with	  the	  New	  Berlin	  image,	  as	  well	  as	  tying	  it	  to	  the	  historical	  period	  of	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate.	  In	  order	  to	  fit	  in	  with	  its	  surroundings,	  the	  façade	  and	  form	  of	  the	  building	  kept	  in	  line	  with	  critical	  reconstruction	  guidelines.	  The	  only	  point	  of	  discussion	  was	  the	  planned	  opening,	  which	  Stimmann	  thought	  detracted	  from	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate’s	  function	  as	  sole	  gateway	  to	  the	  square.	  MRY	  meant	  this	   opening	   to	   “dramatically	   split”	   the	   “simple	   stone	   façade,”	   providing	   for	   an	   entrance	  “light	   and	   glassy	   between	   the	   stone	  walls,”	   bringing	   “a	  wash	   of	   light	   into	   the	   otherwise	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shadowy	  northwest	  wall,	  and	  light[ing]	  the	  flag	  as	  it	  swoops	  out	  at	  a	  jaunty	  angle	  over	  the	  sidewalk”	   (Yudell	   140).	   To	   form	   a	   “dialogue”	   with	   its	   surroundings,	   MRY	   designed	   a	  “lantern”	  on	  the	  top	  floor	  of	  the	  embassy,	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  create	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Reichstag,	  Brandenburg	  Gate,	  and	  Potsdamer	  Platz	  in	  the	  evening	  Berlin	  sky.	  Because	  of	  its	  corner	  location,	  the	  Embassy	  had	  three	  open	  sides:	  on	  Pariser	  Platz,	  along	  the	  Tiergarten,	  and	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  memorial.	  Instead	  of	  a	  unified	  aesthetic,	  MRY	  opted	  for	  three	  different	  façades	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  different	  surroundings.	  As	  described	  by	  Ruble,	  the	  building	  was	  “an	  assemblage	  of	  many	  parts”	  (Wise,	  “The	  Ugly	  American”).	  	  An	   international	   jury,	   including	   architects	   from	   Great	   Britain	   and	   former	   Berlin	  Mayor	  Klaus	  Schütz,	  chose	  MRY’s	  design.	  Only	  the	  second	  design	  competition	   in	  embassy	  building	   history,	   it	   showed	   that	   the	   U.S.	   was	   taking	   the	   project	   seriously.	   It	   fact,	   it	   is	  probably	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   guidelines	   that	   architecture	   firm	   MRY	   won	   the	   design	  competition.	  Their	  design	  fit	  into	  the	  whole	  better	  than	  Venturi’s,	  which	  included	  blue	  and	  red	  stripes	  along	  the	  façade,	  and	  also	  would	  have	  included	  a	  large	  video	  screen,	  projecting	  images	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  like	  baseball	  games	  and	  concerts	  (Wise).	  Plans	  for	  the	  MRY	  design	  were	  finalized	  in	  1996	  and	  construction	  was	  planned	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  
Security	  Changes	  Then	   came	   the	   attacks	   on	   U.S.	   embassies	   in	   Eastern	   Africa	   (1988),	   which	   led	   to	  increased	   security	   regulations,	   and	   MRY’s	   competition	   winning	   design	   took	   on	   a	   much	  different	  form.	  From	  the	  aerial	  perspective,	   the	  building’s	  ground	  plan	  went	  from	  being	  a	  full	   figure	   8	   to	   a	   letter	   C.	   A	   whole	   wing	   of	   offices,	   originally	   bordering	   Frank	   Gehry’s	  Deutsche	   Zentral-­‐Genossenschaftsbank	   (DZ)	   Bank	   were	   eliminated,	   ruining	   hopes	   of	  uniting	  all	  embassy	  functions	  under	  one	  roof.	  The	  lodge	  was	  scrapped	  for	  a	  “Berlin	  Totem”	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sculpture	   by	   Ellsworth	   Kelly.	   A	   parking	   garage	   turned	   into	   a	   very	   secure	   foundation,	  including	   a	   three-­‐foot	   thick	   concrete	   base.	   Instead	   of	   meeting	   up	   flat	   with	   Josef	   Paul	  Kleiheus’	  Haus	  Sommer,	  the	  embassy	  was	  now	  set	  back	  further	  from	  the	  street.	  In	  all,	  these	  changes	   show	   a	   “pulling	   back”	   from	   its	   surroundings,	   caused	   both	   by	   the	   demanded	  security	  zone	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  U.S.	  funding	  from	  180	  million	  to	  130	  million.	  The	  negotiation	  stages	  of	  the	  security	  measures	  revealed	  the	  German	  government’s	  use	  of	  the	  historical	  form	  of	  Parizer	  Platz	  to	  reject	  U.S.	  security	  intervention	  on	  German	  soil.	  Initially	   the	   U.S.	   requested	   a	   thirty-­‐meter	   security	   zone	   around	   the	   building	   and	   guard	  shacks	  to	  be	  manned	  by	  U.S.	  personnel	  on	  German-­‐owned	  public	  space.	  Berlin	  Senator	  of	  City	  Development	  Peter	  Streider	  quickly	  denied	  these	  two	  requests.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  thirty-­‐meter	   security	   zone	   would	   have	   required	   moving	   two	   streets	   close	   to	   the	   embassy,	  Ebertstraße	   and	   Behrenstraße.	   This	   would	   have	   interfered	  with	   the	   historical	   form	   and	  historical	  street	  plan	  around	  the	  square.	  Berlin	  was	  only	  willing	  to	  give	  the	  U.S.	  twenty-­‐two	  meters.	  Secondly,	  concerning	  U.S.	  security	  presence	  on	  German	  soil,	  Streider	  remarked	  “It	  is	  unthinkable	  that	  the	  Americans	  practice	  sovereign	  rights	  [Hoheitsrechte]	  in	  public	  space;	  guardhouses	   further	   contradict	   the	   required	   form	   guidelines	   [Gestaltungssatzung]”	  (Lessen).15	  Furthermore,	   the	   mayor’s	   speaker	   expressed,	   “we	   simply	   cannot	   allow	   the	  United	  States	  to	  help	  itself	  to	  a	  slice	  of	  the	  Tiergarten”	  (Lessen).	  In	   remembering	   the	   incident,	   Ambassador	   Kornblum	   remarked,	   “It	   was	   seen	   as	  some	   kind	   of	   imperialistic	   demand	   to	   move	   the	   street	   a	   few	   feet”	   (Wise,	   “The	   Ugly	  American”).	  In	  fact,	  the	  standoff	  reached	  “comical	  proportions”	  when	  Berlin	  Mayor	  Diepgen	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  This	  statement	  is	  interesting,	  considering	  that	  the	  two	  structures	  flanking	  the	  Brandenburg	  Gate	  were	  originally	  guardhouses	  for	  the	  city	  gate	  themselves.	  	  Therefore,	  guardhouses	  were	  not	  necessarily	  a	  historically	  new	  phenomenon	  to	  Pariser	  Platz.	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saw	  Ambassador	  Kornblum	  entering	  a	  McDonald’s	  and	  remarked	  that	  perhaps	  the	  United	  States	   should	   just	   build	   a	   McDonald’s	   on	   Pariser	   Platz	   instead	   (Cohen).	   Kornblum	  countered	  this	  comment	  on	  a	  visit	   to	  Bavaria,	  when	  he	  mentioned	  that	  maybe	  the	  United	  States	   should	   build	   the	   Embassy	   at	   Neuschwanstein—it	   was	   definitely	   secure,	   and	   the	  Bavarians	   had	   always	   been	   true	   to	   the	   Americans	   (Cohen).	   In	   these	   jokes,	   the	   conflict	  reached	   a	   low	   point,	   in	   which	   politicians	   turned	   away	   from	   cooperation,	   seeking	   gain	  instead	   in	  public	  humiliation	  of	   their	   rivals,	   and	   revealing	   the	  underlying	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Berlin.	  Finally	  in	  2002	  a	  security	  compromise	  was	  found.	  Colin	  Powell	  reduced	  the	  required	  security	   zone	   to	   twenty-­‐five	  meters,	  while	   adding	   height	   to	   the	   security	   fences.	   The	  U.S.	  gave	  up	   the	  request	   for	  guard	  shacks	  and	  U.S.	   controlled	  security	  checkpoints	   in	  German	  public	  space;	  Berlin	  was	  willing	  to	  allow	  the	  needed	  three	  meters	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise,	  by	  slightly	  diverting	  Ebertstraße.	  Seventeen	  meters	  of	  the	  security	  zone	  were	  to	  be	  located	  on	  German	  soil,	  and	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Embassy	  would	  create	  the	  other	  eight	  meters.	  	  MRY	   hoped	   to	   balance	   security	   with	   transparency	   in	   their	   implementation	   of	  security	  guidelines.	  Even	  in	  1996,	  balancing	  security	  with	  other	  aspects	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  one	  of	   Yudell’s	   aims:	   to	   “combine	   respect	   for	   classical	   tradition	   and	   for	   security	   needs	   with	  forward-­‐looking,	  contemporary	  sense	  of	  design”	  (Kinzer).	  After	  the	  building’s	  completion,	  Ruble	   stated	   that	   he	   thought	   security	   measures	   were	   included	   at	   Pariser	   Platz	   without	  causing	   much	   disruption	   to	   the	   historical	   city	   plan:	   “Pariser	   Platz	   has	   been	   completely	  redesigned	  to	  address	  the	  security	  issue	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  visible…It	  looks	  like	  it’s	  part	  of	  the	   city”	   (Hickley).	   In	   Ruble’s	   mind,	   the	   security	   measures	   were	   almost	   invisible.	   This	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coincides	  with	  a	  popular	  U.S.	   trend	   in	  security	   following	   the	  9/11	   terrorist	  attacks	  called	  “transparent	  security”:	  	  Security	   need	   not	   be	   obtrusive,	   obvious,	   or	   restrictive	   to	   be	   effective.	  Installing	   concrete	   barriers	   in	   front	   of	   buildings	   may	   discourage	   vehicular	  bomb	   threats,	   but	   will	   not	   necessarily	   ensure	   greater	   security	   within	  buildings	   unless	   other	   elements	   are	   addressed.	   Transparent	   security,	   not	  visible	  to	  the	  public	  eye,	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  informed	  planning,	  design,	  and	  facility	  operations	  (Nadel	  1.8).	  	  An	   example	   of	   this	   would	   be	   solid	   flowerbeds	   located	   in	   front	   of	   the	   U.S.	   and	   French	  embassies	   on	   Pariser	   Platz,	   used	   to	   be	   aesthetically	   pleasing	   but	   also	   reduce	   car	   bomb	  threats,	  or	   trees	  used	  to	  cover	  ominous	   looking	  steel	  security	   fences,	  or	  security	  cameras	  embedded	  in	  lampposts.	  “Transparent	  security”	  was	  desirable	  because	  it	  fulfilled	  the	  need	  to	  be	  accountable	  as	  an	  architect	  and	  also	  allowed	  for	  a	  more	  aesthetically	  pleasing	  result.	  However,	  as	  the	  reception	  of	  the	  embassy	  would	  soon	  show,	  much	  of	  the	  attempts	  to	  make	  the	   security	   invisible	   were	   futile.	   For	   one,	   the	   foliage	   did	   not	   have	   time	   to	   grow.	  Additionally,	   Berliners	   were	   primed	   to	   look	   for	   the	   security	   measures	   because	   of	   press	  coverage	   of	   the	   negotiation	   and	   building	   phases,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   long	   history	   dealing	   with	  transparent	   security	   in	   Berlin,	   as	   the	   Stasi	   files	   can	   attest.	   The	   implementation	   of	   these	  “transparent	  security”	  measures	  would	  soon	  become	  a	  pivotal	  issue	  in	  revealing	  diverging	  interpretations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  architecture.	  
	  	  
42	  
III.	  RECEPTION	  OF	  THE	  COMPLETED	  EMBASSY	  Around	  4,500	  specially	  invited	  guests,	  including	  German	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel,	  U.S	   President	   George	  H.W.	   Bush,	   and	   U.S.	   Ambassador	   William	   Timken,	   celebrated	   the	  opening	  of	   the	  U.S.	   Embassy	  on	   July	  4,	   2008.16	  Among	   red,	  white,	   and	  blue	  balloons,	   and	  concealed	  behind	  temporarily	  installed	  fences,	  invited	  guests	  enjoyed	  music	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Air	  Force	  jazz	  band,	  carefully	  crafted	  political	  speeches,	  and	  evening	  fireworks	  at	  Pariser	  Platz.	  Beer	   from	  Boston	   and	  wine	   from	  California	   refreshed	   guests	   as	   they	   consumed	   chili	   con	  carne	  and	  mini-­‐hamburgers.	  	  Although	   it	  would	   have	   been	   hard	   to	   tell	   from	   the	   celebratory	   atmosphere	   of	   the	  ceremony,	   the	   highly	   secured	   U.S.	   embassy	   was	   already	   under	   attack—in	   the	   German	  media.	   Far	   from	   celebratory,	   the	   majority	   of	   German	   newspaper	   and	   magazine	   articles	  covering	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy’s	   completion	   took	   a	   critical	   tone.	   The	   criticisms	   focused	   on	  aesthetic	  and	  security	  concerns.	  In	  their	  wake,	  several	  articles	  defending	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  or	  explaining	  the	  controversy	  itself	  appeared,	  mostly	  from	  American	  or	  U.S.	  targeted	  media.	  This	  outburst	  of	  discourse	  concerning	  the	  embassy,	  confirmed	  that	  the	  embassy’s	  meaning	  was	   not	   set	   in	   stone	   as	   construction	   finished;	   rather,	   it	   was	   still	   open	   to	   interpretation.	  Through	   discourse,	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   U.S.	   embassy	   was	   (re)constructed.	   If	   we	   follow	  Huyssen’s	   lead,	   in	   comparing	   Berlin	   to	   “a	   city-­‐text,”	   then	   the	   text’s	   chapter	   on	   the	   U.S.	  Embassy	  corresponds	  with	   the	  whole:	   “frantically	  being	  written	  and	  rewritten”	   (49).	  The	  vision	   the	  United	  States	  and	   its	  architects	  had	  hoped	   to	  project	  often	  did	  not	  correspond	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  not	  invited,	  and	  was	  instead	  invited	  to	  meet	  with	  Merkel	  in	  June	  in	  Meseberg	  (Bauer).	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with	  the	  German	  media’s	  reception	  of	  the	  building.	  Through	  media	  analysis,	  this	  divergence	  of	  interpretation	  becomes	  evident.	  	  
Criticism	  	   In	   examining	   the	  German	  media	   representation	  of	   the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  an	  overriding	  theme	  seems	  to	  emerge:	  the	  United	  States	  had	  sacrificed	  aesthetics	  and	  quality	  architecture	  in	  its	  excessive	  preoccupation	  with	  security.	  Initially	  criticizing	  the	  architecture’s	  aesthetics,	  including	  the	  appearance	  of	  security	  measures,	  several	  articles	  show	  a	  tendency	  to	  use	  the	  building’s	   appearance	   as	   a	   springboard	   for	   other	   criticisms.	   For	   example,	   they	   would	  transfer	  to	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy,	  culture,	  and	  politics.	  	   In	  discussing	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy’s	  security	  measures,	   journalists	  were	  not	   lacking	   in	  their	   use	   of	   simile	   and	   metaphor;	   the	   harshest	   criticisms	   of	   U.S.	   security	   in	   German	  newspapers	  and	  magazine	  articles	   took	  a	   figurative	   turn.	  Upon	  entering	   the	   realm	  of	   the	  figurative,	  the	  building’s	  specific	  physical	  characteristics	  triggered	  what	  Huyssen	  calls	  the	  “urban	   imaginary”	   (Huyssen	   7).	   Spatially	   remote	   images—such	   as	   a	   New	   Jersey	   office	  building	   or	   a	   former	   San	   Francisco	   prison—and	   temporally	   distant	   images—like	   a	  medieval	  castle—competed	   for	   the	  same	  space	  at	  Pariser	  Platz.	  Here,	  Paul	  de	  Man’s	  “The	  Epistemology	  of	  Metaphor”	  is	  informative:	  It	  is	  indeed	  not	  a	  question	  of	  ontology,	  of	  things	  as	  they	  are,	  but	  of	  authority,	  of	   things	   as	   they	   are	   decreed	   to	   be	   […]	   We	   have	   no	   way	   of	   defining,	   of	  policing,	  the	  boundaries	  that	  separate	  the	  name	  of	  one	  entity	  from	  the	  name	  of	   the	   other;	   tropes	   are	   not	   just	   travellers,	   they	   tend	   to	   be	   smugglers	   […]	  What	  makes	  matters	  worse	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	  way	   of	   finding	   out	  whether	  they	  do	  so	  with	  criminal	  intent	  or	  not	  (de	  Man	  18-­‐19).17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Using	  de	  Man’s	  philosophical	  work	  as	  support,	  I	  am	  taking	  the	  cue	  of	  Eric	  Jarosinski’s	  “Building	  on	  a	  Metaphor:	  Democracy,	  Transparency	  and	  the	  Berlin	  Reichstag,”	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  metaphor	  of	  transparency	  embodied	  in	  the	  Reichstag.	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Like	  de	  Man,	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  here	  in	  policing	  the	  meanings	  of	  the	  metaphors	  used,	  but	  rather	   in	   exploring	   what	   they	   suggest	   about	   the	   embassy’s	   interpretation,	   and	   how	   the	  various	   images	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   buildings	   reception	   compete	   for	   power	   in	   the	  construction	   of	   meaning.	   In	   describing	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   through	  metaphor	   and	   visions,	  both	  Germans	  and	  U.S.	  Americans	  blurred	  the	  lines	  between	  the	  actual	  building,	  and	  what	  they	   “decreed”	   the	   building	   to	   be,	   often	   “smuggling”	   in	   visions	   suited	   to	   advancing	   their	  own	  political	  aims.	  The	  Stern	  article	  from	  July	  3,	  places	  its	  metaphor	  in	  the	  title:	  “US	  Botschaft:	  Alcatraz	  hinter	   Sandstein-­‐Fassaden”	   (Kaspar).	   With	   this	   image,	   the	   embassy	   becomes	   a	   prison.	  Undoubtedly,	   both	   prisons	   and	   embassies	   are	   secure	   buildings.	   However,	   using	   this	  comparison	   brings	   with	   it	   a	   connotative	   meaning.	   Prisons	   are	   filled	   with	   cells,	   and	  inhabited	   by	   criminals.	   Not	   only	   is	   this	   metaphor	   rousing	   images	   of	   security,	   but	   also	  connotations	   of	   criminals	   behind	   its	   sandstone	   façades.	   It	   is	   almost	   as	   if	   guilt	   could	   be	  placed	  on	  the	  workers,	  who	  become	  ambassadors	  of	  a	  criminal	  regime.	  Later	  in	  the	  article	  we	  find	  the	  windows	  described	  as	  “Fenster[...]	  schmal	  wie	  Schießscharten”	  (Kaspar).	  Here	  the	   connotation	   is	   one	   of	   defense	   and	   battle,	   a	   building	   with	   windows	   small	   enough	   to	  provide	  protection,	  yet	  also	  big	  enough	  to	  use	  lethal	  force	  against	  those	  on	  the	  outside,	  in	  this	  case,	  against	  those	  in	  the	  public	  space	  of	  Pariser	  Platz.	  	  In	   the	  Berliner	  Zeitung,	   the	   U.S.	   embassy	   became	   “a	   fortress,	   a	  maximum	   security	  prison	  made	  of	  reinforced	  steel	  and	  bulletproof	  glass	  that	  can	  withstand	  exploding	  trucks	  and	   rocket	   fire”	   (Smith)18.	   Here	   the	   juxtaposition	   of	   fortress	   with	   a	   maximum-­‐security	  prison	   blurs	   the	   lines	   between	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion,	   in	   effect	   turning	   insiders	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  As	  cited	  in	  Smith’s	  Spiegel	  Online	  article.	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outsiders:	   the	   United	   States	   is	   imprisoning	   itself	   in	   its	   own	   fortress.	   In	   describing	   the	  rotunda	   of	   the	   embassy,	   the	  Tageszeitung	  makes	   the	   same	   reference:	   “eine	   Rotunde,	   die	  jedoch	   an	   einen	   gefängnisartigen	   Hinterhof	   erinnert”	   (Lautenschläger).	   Similarly,	   the	  
Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  likens	  the	  embassy	  to	  Fort	  Knox:	  “Die	  Botschaft	  erstreckt	  sich	  wie	  eine	  postmoderne,	  cremefarbene	  Trutzburg	  den	  Tiergarten	  entlang,	  umgeben	  von	  einem	  hohen	  Zaun.	  Es	  ist	  ein	  Fort	  Knox	  am	  Brandenburger	  Tor”	  (Grassmann).	  Fort	  Knox,	  the	  gold	  bullion	  depository,	  is	  after	  all	  located	  on	  a	  U.S.	  military	  base	  and	  the	  connection	  to	  the	  U.S.	  military	  in	  Berlin	  is	  easy	  to	  make.	  Apparently	  the	  U.S.	  “transparent	  security”	  was	  “seen	  through”	  and	  American	   security	   presence	   in	   the	   center	   of	   Berlin	   was	   criticized.	   As	   the	   concluding	  allusion	   from	  the	  Stern	  article	  seems	  to	  attest,	  Pariser	  Platz	  visitors	  would	  be	  affected	  by	  U.S.	   security:	   “Welcome,	   aber:	   Big	   Brother	   is	   watching	   you”	   (Kaspar).	   This	   reference	  compares	   the	   United	   States	   to	   the	   Orwellian	   fascist	   state	   in	   1984,	   and	   questions	   the	  compatibility	   of	   security	   cameras	   and	   democratic	   government.	   Here	   the	   issue	   is	   state	  power.	  Next,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   often	   cited	   metaphors	   can	   be	   found	   in	   in	   the	   title	   of	   the	  
Tageszeitung	   article	   of	   May	   22:	   “The	   Embassy-­‐Bunker	   of	   the	   United	   States”	  (Lautenschläger).	  This	  bunker	  metaphor	  also	  appeared	  in	  the	  Frankfurter	  Allgemeine:	  “Hier	  zeigt	  sich	  Amerika	  als	  vollkommen	  undurchdringliche,	  erratische	  Bunkerexistenz”	  (Maak).	  The	  bunker	  metaphor	  connotes	  images	  of	  war,	  and	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  famous	  German	  NS	   bunkers	   of	   Berlin,	   to	   the	   United	   States’	   “bunker	   existence”	   in	   the	   global	   War	   on	  Terrorism.	   More	   creative	   than	   just	   the	   castle	   metaphor,	   the	   Frankfurter	   Allgemeine	  combines	   security	  with	   prefabrication	   (read:	   cheapness),	   “sie	   ist	   die	  Ritterburg,	   die	  man	  sich	   im	   Baumarkt	   zusammenbasteln	   kann”	   (Maak).	   Whether	   intentional	   or	   not,	   these	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allusions	   to	   similar	   looking	  and	  highly	   secured	  buildings	   carry	   connotations	   further	   than	  aesthetics	  alone.	  They	  bring	  with	  them	  value	  judgments	  of	  American	  culture	  and	  politics.	  Some	   of	   the	   figurative	   language	   took	   an	   abstract	   form.	   Bernau’s	   article	   in	   the	  
Berliner	  Zeitung,	   for	   example,	   states:	   “Der	   Bau	   sieht	   aus	  wie	   die	   Bestätigung	   aller	   linken	  und	   rechten	   deutschen	   Vorurteile	   über	   das	   machthungrige	   kulturfeindliche,	   nur	   reiche,	  aber	   vulgäre	   Amerika.”	   This	   final	   example	   shows,	   without	   a	   doubt,	   that	   the	   embassy’s	  aesthetics	   could	   be	   used	   as	   support	   for	   anti-­‐American	   feelings.	   This	   discussion	   of	  metaphors	   is	   not	   fully	   inclusive,	   but	   these	   selections	   definitely	   show	   how	   figurative	  language	   used	   to	   describe	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy’s	   security	   aspects	   opened	   the	   door	   to	   other	  criticisms	  of	  American	  culture	  and	  U.S.	  politics.	  The	  metaphors	  bring	  up	  mental	  images	  far	  different	  than	  those	  evocative	  of	  a	  global	  or	  critically	  reconstructed	  city.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	   competition	   guidelines	   called	   for	   designs	   that	   created	   a	   “public	   face	   that	  portrays	   an	   open,	   accessible	   government	  while	   accommodating	   security	  measures	   in	   an	  unobtrusive	  manner”	  (Wise,	  “The	  Ugly	  American”).	  However,	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  in	  German	  media	  shows	  that	  security	  and	  openness	  were	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  balance.	  Furthermore,	   the	  perceived	  success	  of	   this	  balancing	  was	   influenced	  by	  political	  aims.	  By	  criticizing	  U.S.	  security	  presence,	  Berliners	  were	  able	  to	  displace	  and	  challenge	  a	  display	  of	  U.S.	  power	  in	  Berlin.	  The	   security	   aspects	   of	   the	   embassy	  were	   not	   the	   only	   grounds	   for	   criticism;	   the	  German	   media	   also	   criticized	   the	   embassy	   on	   aesthetics	   alone.	   For	   example,	   the	  architectural	   critic	   Gerwin	   Zohlen	   called	   the	   exterior	   “merkwürdig	   uninspiriert”	   and	  “erstaunlich	   lieblos	   ausgeführt,”	   basically	   labeling	   it	   an	   outdated	   version	   of	   1980s	  postmodernism	   (“US-­‐Botschaft	   sieht…”).	   To	   sum	   up	   his	   views,	   Zohlen	   suggested	   that	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Berliners	   nickname	   the	   building	   the	   “Pancake,”	   because	   of	   its	   stretched	   out	   and	   boring	  architecture,	  which	   looks	   like	   in	   should	   be	   in	   the	  Midwest,	   not	  Berlin:	   “Es	   passt	   nicht	   in	  eine	   Innenstadt	   des	   Alten	   Europa.	   (“	   US-­‐Botschaft	   sieht…”).	   From	   the	   Frankfurter	  
Allgemeine,	   “Amerika	   reißt	   ein	   Stück	   aus	   seiner	   Mitte,	   knallt	   eine	   durchschnittliche	  Provinzverwaltungszentrale	  aus	  New	  Jersey	  an	  den	  Pariser	  Platz,	  die	  den	  Deutschen	  zeigt,	  wie	   große	   Teile	   von	   Amerika	   halt	   gerade	   aussehen;	   schlecht	   verarbeitet,	   verängstigt,	  nostalgisch,	  heruntergekommen”	  (Maak).	   Interesting	   in	   these	  criticisms	   is	   the	  connection	  between	   place	   and	   aesthetics.	   The	   U.S.	   Embassy’s	   architecture	   was	   perceived	   as	   out	   of	  place	  at	  its	  prominent	  address	  in	  a	  historical	  European	  city.	  The	  façade	  that	  MRY	  thought	  showed	   respect	   for	   its	   host	   nation,	   by	   following	   critical	   reconstruction	   guidelines	   was	  criticized	  for	  its	  blandness,	  and	  compared	  to	  images	  that	  displaced	  the	  building,	  rather	  than	  embedding	  it	  within	  the	  New	  Berlin.	  Often	  aesthetic	  critiques	  led	  into	  criticism	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  The	  U.S.	  embassy	  seemed	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  projection	  screen	  for	  attacks	  on	  the	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  According	  to	  the	  Tageszeitung,	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  embassy	  building	  and	  its	   foreign	   policy	   was	   obvious:	   “Der	   Bau	   ist	   ein	   simples	   Beispiel	   von	   amerikanischer	  Sicherheitsarchitektur	  nach	  9/11	  geworden”	  (Lautenschläger).	  The	  Frankfurter	  Allgemeine	  also	  connects	  the	  building	  with	  U.S.	  politics,	  saying	  that	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  one	  is	  “gerade	  auf	  dem	  Weg	   in	   die	  Green	   Zone	   von	  Bagdad.”	   The	   article	  mentions	   an	   observation	   of	   a	   passerby,	  who	   quipped	   that	   the	   top	   floor	   of	   the	   embassy	   could	   be	   the	   place	   of	   a	   “Wellness-­‐	   und	  Waterboardingbereich,”	  because	  of	   its	   lack	  of	  windows	  (Maak).	   In	   this	  article,	   the	  author	  seems	  to	  praise	  the	  Clinton	  years,	  and	  connects	  them	  to	  better-­‐perceived	  buildings,	  which	  were	  opened	  during	  his	  presidency,	   such	   as	   Frank	  Gehry’s	  DZ-­‐Bank.	  The	   great	   sculpture	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within	   Gehry’s	   bank	   gave	   the	   author	   the	   feel	   that	   Bill	   Clinton	   himself	   could	   be	   up	   there	  playing	  the	  saxophone.	  In	  this	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  Clinton-­‐era	  and	  condemnation	  for	  the	  Bush	  era,	  however,	  one	  should	  not	  forget,	  that	  that	  the	  design	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  is	  partially	  the	  result	  of	  security	  regulations	  passed	  in	  1998,	  during	  Clinton’s	  presidency.	  If	  anything,	  the	  building	  could	  be	  considered	  a	   response	   to	   the	  perils	  of	   globalization	  and	  a	   conservative	  reaction	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Clinton	  regime.	  The	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  November	  11,	  2001	  had	  no	   real	   effect	   on	   the	   embassy	   building’s	   plans.	   However,	   the	   length	   of	   the	   negotiation	  phases	   meant	   that	   the	   building’s	   reception	   would	   take	   place	   during	   President	   Bush’s	  second	  term.	  In	  that	  time,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  America	  had	  been	  tested	  by	  Germany’s	  withdrawal	  of	  support	  for	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq.	  This	  disagreement	  seems	  to	  have	   influenced	   the	  German	   reception	   of	   the	  U.S.	   Embassy	  more	   than	   the	   9/11	   terrorist	  attacks	  influenced	  U.S.	  building	  plans.	  	  
Defenders	  and	  Explainers	  While	  much	  of	   the	  German	  media	   coverage	  manifested	   itself	   in	   the	   form	  of	   harsh	  criticism	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy,	  a	  significant	  response	  defended	  the	  embassy	  and	  attempted	  to	  explain	   the	  criticism	   itself.	  Defenders	  of	   the	  embassy	   included	  Gary	  Smith,	  head	  of	   the	  American	  Academy	   in	   Berlin,	  who	   stated	   that	   the	   criticism	  was	   “ridiculous”:	   “It	   isn’t	   the	  most	  avant-­‐garde	  of	  structures,	  but	  I’m	  glad	  the	  US	  chose	  discretion	  over	  pomposity.	  It	  is	  a	  subtle	   solution	   to	   a	   very	   difficult	   space”	   (Marquand).	   Former	   U.S.	   Ambassador	   to	   Berlin	  Kornblum	  stated,	  “If	  they	  didn’t	  know	  there	  had	  been	  a	  debate	  concerning	  security,	  nobody	  would	  call	  it	  a	  fortress.	  A	  lot	  of	  this	  criticism	  is	  from	  people	  wanting	  to	  tell	  you	  how	  much	  they	   hate	   George	  Bush”	   (Hickley).	   Condoleezza	  Rice	   is	   quoted	   by	   the	  Berliner	  Zeitung	   as	  having	  stated,	   “[w]as	   für	  eine	  großartige	  Botschaft”	   (Paul).	  Several	  articles	  even	   included	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fairly	  long	  interviews	  with	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  William	  Timken.	  When	  pressed	  on	  the	  fortress	  look	  of	  the	  building,	  Timken	  drew	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  German	  Embassy	  in	  Washington,	  and	   reiterated	   that	   one	   could	   get	   closer	   to	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy,	   and	   even	   touch	   it.	   Most	  important	   for	   Timken	  was	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  U.S.	   had	   built	   their	   embassy	   in	   the	   center	   of	  Berlin,	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   partnership:	   “Wir	   hätten	   ja	  mitten	   im	  Wald	   bauen	   können.	   Aber	  wir	  wollten	  ein	  Teil	  Deutschlands	  sein”	  (Leszczynski).	  The	  Newsweek	  article	  seems	  to	  sum	  up	  the	  defender	  and	  explainer	  perspective	  quite	  well:	  “Sadly,	  German	  critics	  have	  chosen	  to	  ridicule	  the	  security	  mandate,	  and	  have	  misread	  the	   building	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   current	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   when	   it	   stands	   for	   the	   very	  opposite—an	  affirmative	  expression	  of	  the	  trust	  and	  mutual	  respect	  that	  makes	  diplomacy	  possible”	   (“The	   Rows	   on	   Embassy	   Rows”).	   However,	   important	   to	   note	   is	   that	   these	  defenders	  and	  explainers	  were	  mostly	  from	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  seems	  to	  suggest	  a	  divergence	  along	  national	  lines	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  meaning	  of	  the	  embassy.	  Why	  did	  security	  of	  the	  US	  Embassy	  set	  off	  so	  much	  criticism	  in	  Berlin?	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  security	  is	  a	  normal	  part	  of	  embassies	  in	  an	  age	  of	  global	  terrorism.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy’s	  location	  in	  the	  center	  of	  Berlin	  caused	  it	  to	  clash	  with	  preexisting	  global	  city	   and	   critical	   reconstruction	   visions.	   As	   already	   examined,	   the	   discourse	   concerning	  Berlin	   as	   becoming	   a	   global	   city	   had	   created	   a	   city	   image	   that	   was	   often	   free	   of	  infrastructural	  limitations.	  The	  security	  fences	  and	  anti-­‐ram	  bollards	  hinted	  at	  the	  negative	  side	   of	   globalization,	   and	   represented	   limitations	   to	   a	   cosmopolitan	   image.	   Furthermore,	  the	  embassy	  would	  become	  a	   limited	  access	  building,	   the	   inside	  of	  which	   the	  majority	  of	  Berliners	  and	  visitors	  would	  never	  see.	  Even	  in	  construction	  phases,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  was	  rather	   concealed,	   and	   photography	  was	   restricted.	   This	   provided	   a	   stark	   contrast	   to	   the	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“open	  city”	  image	  promoted	  by	  Partner	  für	  Berlin,	  in	  which	  construction	  sites	  transformed	  into	  sightseeing	  tours.	  	  	   Concerning	   critical	   reconstruction	   visions,	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy’s	   high	   emphasis	   on	  security	  was	  seen	  as	  being	  incompatible	  with	  good	  architecture.	  The	  subtitle	  of	  a	  Stimmann	  article	  concerning	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  seems	  to	  confirm	  this	  critical	  reconstructionist	  view	  of	  the	   embassy:	   “Die	   neue	   US-­‐Botschaft	   beweist:	   Hohe	   Sicherheitsstandards	   sind	   mit	  städtischer	   Architektur	   unvereinbar”	   (Stimmann).	   High	   security	   measures	   disrupted	   the	  historical	  Raumgestalt,	   or	   collective	   spatial	   form	   of	   the	   square	   formed	   by	   the	   individual	  buildings.	   Instead	   of	   allowing	   the	   building	   to	   fit	   in	   with	   its	   surrounding	   Pariser	   Platz	  neighbors,	   security	   concerns	   “displaced”	   the	   building.	   Critical	   reconstruction	   guidelines	  made	   creating	   an	   aura	   of	   transparency	   difficult,	   much	   more	   so	   than	   it	   had	   been	   for	  Germans	  at	  their	  new	  federal	  government	  headquarters.	  	   In	   its	  defense	  of	   the	  historical	   form	  of	   the	   square,	  Berlin	  was	   able	   to	   show	  a	  new	  self-­‐confidence.	   In	   negotiation	   stages	   of	   U.S.	   security	  measures,	   a	   change	   in	   the	   role	   the	  United	  States	  played	   in	   the	  public	   space	  of	  Berlin	  became	  evident.	  As	   the	  German	  center	  turned	   from	   a	   void	   into	   a	   symbol	   of	   unification,	   the	   days	   when	   the	   U.S.	   was	   seen	   a	  protective	  security	  power	  have	  became	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past.	  German	  media’s	  heavy	  criticism	  of	  U.S.	  security	  measures	  on	  German	  soil	  acted	  as	  a	  way	  of	  reinforcing	  a	  new	  relationship,	  in	  which	  Germany	  sought	  ultimate	  responsibility	  for	  security	  within	  its	  national	  borders.	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Conclusion:	  After	  the	  Reception	  Since	  2008,	  the	  press	  concerning	  the	  United	  States	  Embassy	  has	  calmed.	  Thankfully,	  no	   car	   bombs	   have	   tested	   the	   security	   measures	   of	   the	   building.	   Instead	   the	   only	   real	  attacks	   to	  have	  been	  waged	  on	   the	   embassy	  were	   the	   type	   that	   could	  not	  be	   stopped	  by	  bulletproof	  glass,	  concrete	  bollards,	  or	  security	  checks.	  They	  were	  criticism	  concerning	  the	  security	   preoccupations	   of	   the	   relatively	  modest	   (read:	   dull)	   completed	   U.S.	   Embassy	   at	  Pariser	   Platz	   from	   the	   German	   media.	   Unfortunately	   the	   embassy’s	   design,	   changed	   so	  much	  by	  world	  politics	  and	  reactions	  to	  globalization,	  did	  not	  weather	  these	  criticisms	  well,	  and	  instead	  seemed	  to	  provoke	  them.	  Utopian	  global	  and	  critical	  reconstructionist	  visions—which	  did	  so	  much	  to	  promote	  the	  embassy’s	  return	  to	  Pariser	  Platz	  and	  greatly	  influenced	  its	  completed	  form—could	  not	  be	  turned	  to	  for	  guidance	  in	  answering	  the	  central	  issue	  facing	  the	  United	  States	  Embassy	  after	  the	  1998	  bombings	  in	  Eastern	  Africa.	  Insight	  concerning	  how	  to	  balance	  security	  and	  openness	   in	  public	   space	   in	   the	  21st	   century	   could	  not	  be	   found	   in	   selective	  19th	   century	  based	   street	   plans	   provided	   by	   critical	   reconstruction,	   nor	   in	   utopian	   global	   city	   visions	  promoted	  by	  city	  marketers	  and	  politicians.	  	  In	  fact,	  resistance	  to	  transnational	  cooperation	  may	  have	  helped	  Germany	  exhibit	  its	  emergence	  from	  power	  relations	  lingering	  from	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Because	  of	  its	  emphasis	  on	  Pariser	   Platz’	   historical	   form,	   including	   historic	   street	   plans	   and	   historic	   forested	   areas,	  Berlin	  had	  powerful	  justification	  for	  denying	  U.S.	  requests	  to	  reroute	  city	  streets	  to	  reduce	  the	   embassy’s	   vulnerability.	   Berlin	   was	   able	   to	   take	   a	   stand	   against	   U.S.	   intervention	   in	  German	  public	  space.	  This	  marked	  a	  change	  in	  power	  relations,	  which	  eventually	   led	  to	  a	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compromise,	   from	   which	   the	   award	   winning	   U.S.	   Embassy	   plans	   had	   to	   be	   drastically	  changed.	  The	  embassy	  seemed	  to	  implode	  on	  itself	  because	  of	  security	  concerns,	  a	  fact	  that	  German	  media	  was	  more	  than	  ready	  to	  exploit,	  partially	   in	  response	  to	  disagreements	  on	  national	  foreign	  policy.	  By	  viewing	  U.S.	  security	  concerns	  as	  overanxious	  and	  out	  of	  place,	  the	  German	  media	  was	  able	  to	  distance	  its	  own	  utopian	  global	  visions	  for	  Berlin	  from	  the	  “reactionary”	   global	   security	   concerns	   of	   the	   U.S.,	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   “displace”	   the	   U.S.	  Embassy	  rather	  than	  embed	  it	  wholeheartedly	  within	  the	  New	  Berlin.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  criticisms	  of	  U.S.	  security	  concerns	  were	  more	  closely	  interwoven	  with	  the	  redevelopment	  of	  a	  federal	  government	  headquarters	  in	  Berlin	  than	  would	  first	  appear.	  As	  Foucault	  reminds	  us,	  “critique	  only	  exists	  in	  relation	  to	  something	  other	  than	  itself:	  it	  is	  an	  instrument,	  a	  means	  for	  a	  future,	  […]	  it	  oversees	  a	  domain	  it	  would	  want	  to	  police	  and	  is	  unable	  to	  regulate”	  (Foucault	  25).	  Just	  as	  Berlin	  was	  deciding	  how	  to	  govern	  Germany	  from	  its	   new	   federal	   headquarters	   along	   the	   Spree	   River,	   the	   U.S.	   government	   provided	   them	  with	  an	  example	  of	  a	  governing	  “other”	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  on	  Pariser	  Platz	  2.	  According	  to	  Foucault,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  govern	  and	  the	  “search	  for	  the	  ways	  to	  govern”	  is	  closely	  identified	  with	  the	  “perpetual	  question”	  of	  “how	  not	  to	  be	  governed	  like	  that,	  by	  that,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  those	  principles	  […]	  not	  by	  them”	  (Foucault	  28).	  In	  the	  German	  media	  reception	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  these	  specifics	  become	  more	  focused:	  not	  to	  govern	  like	  the	  U.S.,	  not	  by	  fortress	  looking	  structures	  in	  the	  name	  of	  security,	  not	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  German	   media	   criticism	   of	   U.S.	   security	   measures	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   part	   of	  developing	  a	  more	  general	  critique	  of	  government.	  As	  Ulrich	  Beck’s	  “The	  Terrorist	  Threat”	  argues:	  globalization	  is	  bringing	  about	  modern	  threats	  that	  affect	  the	  world	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  often	   strike	   without	   reverence	   for	   national	   affiliation	   (Beck	   41).	   Global	   warming,	   global	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financial	  crises,	  global	  terrorism—these	  global	  threats	  demand	  transnational	  cooperation,	  in	  which	  cooperation	   is	  not	  put	  on	  political	  grid-­‐lock	  because	  of	  an	  argument	  over	  a	   few	  meters	  of	  sidewalk	  space.	  Perhaps	  the	  reception	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  the	  German	  media	  could	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   relatively	   good	   transnational	   check	   to	   American	   foreign	   policy	   and	  security	  measures,	  which	  may	  have	  been	  overanxious.	  As	  transparent	  in	  form	  as	  they	  may	  be,	  security	  measures	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  people	  who	  encounter	  them.	  Security	  measures	  can,	  in	  themselves,	  create	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  fear	  in	  public	  space.	  However,	  lacking	  in	  much	  of	  the	  German	  media	  reception	  of	  the	  completed	  embassy	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  German	  federal	  government	  also	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  security	  concerns.	  As	   German	   plans	   for	   a	   new	   federal	   government	   headquarters	   also	   attested,	   security	  concerns	  were	  not	  only	  an	  issue	  facing	  the	  United	  States.	  Yet,	  somehow,	  the	  underground	  security	   measures	   beneath	   Germany’s	   federal	   headquarters	   seemed	   to	   be	   more	  “transparent”	  than	  the	  U.S.	  security	  measures;	  German	  steel	  fences	  seemed	  less	  visible	  than	  U.S.	   ones.	   Thus,	   the	   discourse	   remained	   quite	   divided	   along	   national	   lines.	   The	   full	  advantages	  from	  a	  globalized	  critique	  of	  security	  measures	  were	  not	  fulfilled,	  not	  yet	  a	  part	  of	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	   transnational	   “critical	   attitude”	   concerning	   the	   “arts	   of	   governing”	  	  (Foucault	  28).	  	   Interestingly	   enough,	   since	   2008,	   a	   change	   in	   the	   U.S.	   government	   has	   led	   to	   an	  improved	  image	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  Berlin.	  This	  became	  evident	  in	  exhibits	  held	  at	  the	  museum	  “The	  Kennedys,”	  which	  is	  located	  at	  Pariser	  Platz	  4a,	  on	  the	  opposite	  corner	  of	  the	  square	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy.	  Operated	  by	  Camera	  Work,	  “The	  Kennedys,”	  opened	  on	  November	  11,	  2006,	  includes	  a	  permanent	  exhibit	  of	  Kennedy	  photographs.	  Der	  Spiegel	  describes	  the	  museum	   as	   “Camelot	   comes	   to	   Berlin,”	   and	   suggests	   that	   the	   museum	   “may	   remind	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Germans	   and	   Americans	   of	   a	   better	   era	   in	   trans-­‐Atlantic	   relations”	   (Moore).	   Since	   the	  completion	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy,	   the	   museum	   has	   partnered	   up	   with	   its	   Pariser	   Platz	  neighbor	  on	  several	  occasions.	  For	  example,	  an	  ongoing	  partnership	   is	   the	   “U.S.	  Embassy	  Literature	  Series,”	  which	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  museum.	  President	  Obama	  has	  been	  the	  feature	  of	  several	  exhibits	  at	  The	  Kennedys,	  including	  “Obama’s	  People,”	  which	  featured	  images	  of	  his	  administration	   in	  2008.	   In	  2009,	   the	  museum	  linked	  President	  Obama	  with	  President	  Kennedy	   in	   “President	   Barack	   Obama	   –	   On	   the	   Tracks	   of	   the	   Kennedys.”19	  	   This	   exhibit	  highlighted	  the	  parallels	  between	  the	  35th	  and	  44th	  president.	  	  This	  linking	  of	  Obama	  with	  Kennedy	  in	  Berlin	  is	  intriguing,	  as	  it	  connects	  the	  current	  U.S.	  government	  with	  its	  Cold	  War	  predecessor	  in	  Berlin.	  These	  allusions	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  past	  were	  exactly	  what	  “critical	  reconstruction”	  guidelines	  and	  visions	  of	  Berlin	  as	  a	  “global	  city”	   purposely	   avoided.	   “Architectural	   citations”	   (Goebel	   1268)	   in	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	  building	   to	   this	  Cold	  War	  past	  were	  also	  resisted.	  Thus,	   the	  partnership	  between	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  and	  The	  Kennedys	  museum	  at	  Pariser	  Platz	  reveals	  an	  interesting	  transformation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  image	  and	  presence	  at	  Pariser	  Platz,	  one	  that	  seems	  more	  open	  to	  remembering	  a	  special	  Cold	  War	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  Berlin,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  embeds	   the	   U.S.	   presence	   at	   Pariser	   Platz	   much	   more	   than	   the	   initial	   reception	   of	   the	  completed	   U.S.	   Embassy.	   If,	   as	   has	   been	   suggested,	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   truly	   acts	   as	   a	  projection	  screen	  for	  Berliners’	  representation	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  it	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  follow	  how	  the	  discourse	  concerning	  the	  U.S.	  presence	  at	  Pariser	  Platz	  continues	  to	  change	  as	  the	  future	  unfolds.20	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